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# Intelligence Report

*The CPSU Under Brezhnev – Part II*

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## THE CPSU UNDER BREZHNEV

### Part II: The Party Apparatus

Part I of this memorandum analyzed the mass membership of the CPSU that General Secretary Brezhnev inherited from his predecessor, Khrushchev, what Brezhnev has made of it, and what problems he, in turn, will leave for his successor. Part II addresses the subject of the party bureaucracy—the full-time party officials who are paid from party funds and who form a discrete hierarchy in the Soviet body politic.

### Summary

The party bureaucracy that Brezhnev inherited from Khrushchev was a relatively lean and certainly a hungry one, considering the growth in party membership. It was also confused and disturbed. The insecurity bred of Stalin's bloody purges had been replaced by career insecurity engendered by successive reorganizations, frequent personnel shakeups, lateral transfers from one region to another, and a new party statute requiring a periodic turnover in office holders. Serious questions had been raised publicly about the party officialdom's role in Soviet society, tensions were rising between the center and regional party officials, and generational frictions were emerging.

Brezhnev and his colleagues on the Secretariat have for the most part confined their efforts to undoing Khrushchev's organizational experiments and to reassuring the party veterans. The Central Committee apparatus in Moscow is now organized very much along functional or branch production lines that prevailed under Stalin. The basic regional structure of the nationwide party apparatus—tinkered with and restructured by Khrushchev so that it became a spiderweb of overlapping functions and jurisdictions—has been reaffirmed, and its chain of command clarified.

Party officials at all levels have enjoyed an unprecedented period of job security, not only because the turnover requirement has been lifted, but also because cadres policy has emphasized stability and continuity. Lateral transfers, common under Khrushchev, have been the exception, and vacancies have as a rule been filled

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by promotion from within the appropriate party organization. Local party organizations have, in fact, been taken to task for "too much" turnover of their officials, and Moscow--while giving lip service to the wisdom of promoting deserving young officials--has insisted on a "proper" combination of "senior experienced cadres with young workers."

Veteran party officials have been reassured not only by secure tenure but by "clarification" of their role vis-a-vis the government. The distinction between the two, which had begun to blur under Khrushchev, has been sharpened and the party officials' traditional role of exhortation and "control" has been reaffirmed. Dangerous new ideas--for example, that a party official should be chosen for some expertise other than Marxism-Leninism--have been quashed.

No change is ever completely erased, of course, and Khrushchev's influence is still visible in an increased concern with information flow within the party--up, down, and laterally--often with an added fillip of potentially revisionist "sociological research." There is also continuing evidence of concern about "collectivity" of decision-making and "internal party democracy." That these are code words heavily laden with implications for Kremlin politics is not in dispute. Nevertheless, Central Committee pronouncements on the subject do have an additional valid existence as a record of the general instructions issued to all party officials, regardless of their individual awareness of hidden significance. And the subject has been repeatedly discussed in public in the past 11 years.

Exact figures on the total size of the full-time paid apparatus are hard to come by now. In 1971 at the 24th Congress, Brezhnev coyly claimed that there had been a 20-percent reduction "during the past 14 years," carefully including in his time frame the Khrushchev period when the number had indeed been cut by 30 to 40 percent. Nevertheless, changes since 1964 in party regulations and straightforward organizational measures establishing new positions provide considerable evidence to support the conclusion that the size of the total party apparatus has burgeoned under Khrushchev's successors.

The educational level of party officials has continued to rise, although at a slower rate than under Khrushchev. Not surprisingly, considering the reaffirmation of the traditional role of the party official, the number of professional party workers--those who essentially made their careers in the party as opposed to those who started in production and later transferred to party work--has increased significantly except in the Central Committee apparatus. Even there, professional party workers are believed to hold at least 60 percent of the posts.

The post-Khrushchev period has also produced a group of office-holders who are older and have more years of party membership to their credit and longer tenure as members of the ruling elite than the people holding office in October 1964 had at that time. On the other hand, there has been a drop in the number of those whose party membership or tenure in the elite dates back to the earlier periods in the party's history. There have been few significant changes in the ethnic composition of the group holding office at this level.

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The long period of cadres stability has had some political consequences. Career tenure and promotion from within have diminished the importance of patronage ties to the top. With no visible stick to brandish to replace Stalin's purges and Khrushchev's constant shakeups, Moscow must depend on other conventional political tools to ensure its leadership, leaving it vulnerable to the pressures of special regional and institutional interests. Moreover, the longer an official stays in one region, the more he will reflect the interests of that region, a problem that Moscow periodically worries aloud about in warnings against "parochialism." Fresh approaches to problems of long standing have been difficult to sell because someone's ox will inevitably be gored in a change. Finally, there is some evidence of malaise among younger party officials, who are bored with the "old ways" and stifled by a lack of "headroom."

In Soviet history, periods of "change" have alternated with those of "stability." Khrushchev's tenure was one of "change" in reaction to the immobility of the later Stalin years. Brezhnev in turn has opted for "stability" in reaction to Khrushchev's restless years. The next long-term General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee may well be confronted with rising pressures for "change" in the party as well as in other institutions in the Soviet Union.

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## I. The Apparatus under Khrushchev

In October 1952 the 19th Party Congress announced that the size of the party bureaucracy had been somewhat reduced since the 18th Congress in March 1939, even though the party membership had almost tripled since then.<sup>1</sup> The Soviet leadership nevertheless demanded further reductions, and the initial post-Stalin period brought a 24.7-percent reduction in the staff of the CPSU Central Committee.<sup>2</sup> It was Party Secretary Suslov, however, not First Secretary Khrushchev, who praised this development at the 20th Congress, held in February 1956.<sup>3</sup> It was also Suslov who called for a reduction in the number of paid party workers assigned to the regional party organizations—a cutback that had its main impact on city and rayon staffs, accounting for almost 90 percent of the professional party workers assigned to the various local units. Khrushchev was lobbying for a CPSU Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR, a new organ that would improve control over the local party units in the Russian Republic, but would also increase the size of the central party bureaucracy. When it came to the local units Khrushchev was for the preservation of the status quo, particularly at the rayon level.<sup>4</sup>

Khrushchev had his way on the RSFSR Bureau, but only brief success in preserving the status quo in the staffing of the local party committees. The following years brought a large reduction in the number of local units entitled to full-time professional staffs. (Table I) Meanwhile, CPSU Central Committee resolutions adopted in 1956 and 1957 ordered a 25- to 30-percent cutback in the staffs of the union republic, kray, and oblast party committees, a 15- to 20-percent reduction in those of the rural rayon party committees, and a 10- to 15-percent reduction in those of the city and urban rayon party committees.<sup>5</sup> Between January 1956 and October 1961, the number of “responsible workers” assigned to local units was reduced by 25.2 percent and the number of “technical workers” by 22.7 percent.<sup>6</sup>

The number of paid party officials in late 1961 was, however, still very close to the 1939 figure.<sup>7</sup> Consequently, the drive to curb the size of the professional staff was reinforced by an amendment to the party statutes at the 22nd Congress in October 1961. In the past, primary party organizations with more than 100 members had been entitled to have at least one official exempted from his regular duties at his place of work in order to be able to conduct the business of the primary party organization.<sup>8</sup> The number of such units had increased from approximately 6,650 in January 1956 to almost 15,000 by October 1961.<sup>9</sup> Under the 1961 amendment only primary party organizations with 150 or more members could qualify for a full-time official.<sup>10</sup> This amendment probably reduced the number of full-time party jobs by another 10,000.

This conclusion is based on an assumption that less than 40 percent of the primary party organizations with more than 100 members in late 1951 had more than 150 members at that time. It also seems likely that the number of units with 100 to 150 members could grow faster during the early 1960s than the number of primary party units with more than 150 members.

#### **Renovation—A Permanent Bloodless Purge**

Another amendment to the party statutes at the 22nd Congress limited the number of consecutive terms that a person could serve on any party body, or in any elective post in the party bureaucracy (exceptions could be made, but apparently were to be few and far between—especially outside Moscow).<sup>11</sup> At least one fourth of the people elected to the CPSU Central Committee and its Presidium at each congress were to be new faces who had not served on those bodies during the previous term of office. Similar quotas were established for the regular elections at the union republic, kray, oblast, okrug, city, rayon, and primary party organizations. At least one third of those elected to union republic central committees, kray party committees, and oblast party committees, and at least half of those elected to okrug, city, and rayon party committees were to be newcomers, as were half of those elected to committees or bureaus of primary party organizations.

These quotas made it easier to bring new blood into the hierarchy, and meant less job security for those already holding office. Still another amendment to the statutes at the 22nd Congress made party officials more accountable to those who had elected them by providing guidelines for their removal from office.<sup>12</sup>

The moves to curb the power of the professional staff were accompanied by increased reliance on unpaid volunteers to perform duties that had in the past been handled only by the paid functionaries. The early 1960s brought a large increase in the number of people making up the party's elective "aktiv"—especially at the primary party organization, shop party organizations and party group levels. (Table II) This increase probably began in the late 1950s.

The increase in the number of shop party organizations and party groups between January 1956 and October 1961 more than offset the decrease in the number of primary party organizations during that period. An amendment to the party statutes at the 20th Congress in 1956 had made it possible for shop party organizations to be established at enterprises, institutions, collective farms, etc., where the primary party organization had more than 50 party members and candidate members, rather than 100 communists on its rolls. The same amendment also had made it possible for party groups to be formed in shops, brigades, etc., where the shop party organization had more than 50 party members and candidate members, rather than 100 such communists.



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It also was in the late 1950s that there was a sharp increase in the number of people given assignments as non-salaried party workers—instructors, lecturers, or members of the various standing commissions of the regional party organizations. The number of people given such assignments increased rapidly after a CPSU Central Committee resolution was adopted on the subject in September 1958.<sup>13</sup> In the succeeding three years, more than 80,000 nonstaff instructors were added to the rolls of the union republic central committees and the kray, oblast, city, and rayon party committees, and more than 90,000 communists were taking part in the work of the special commissions and councils attached to those party organizations.<sup>14</sup>

The practice of giving such assignments to unpaid volunteers not only enabled the authorities to keep a lid on the size of the professional staff but also provided a means of making fuller use of the expertise of the increasingly sophisticated rank-and-file party members. Meanwhile, salaried party officials also were acquiring a greater measure of sophistication. (Table III) Their level of education rose even faster than that for the party membership as a whole. The post-Stalin increase in party officials with a higher education meant an increase in engineers, agronomists, economists, etc. Contrary to the trend during the Stalin years, relatively few were generalists who had graduated from the Higher Party School in Moscow or a regional party school, but had never attended any other institution of higher learning.

#### **A Regional or a Production Branch Structure**

In the late 1950s, economic management was reorganized on a regional basis, making it all but certain that there would be changes in the party bureaucracy, but these were slow in coming. The CPSU Secretariat was divided into two parts—one for the Russian Republic, and the other supervising matters in the union republics. The Central Committee apparatus remained organized along "production branch" lines, however, with individual departments for the various sectors of the economy.

A number of measures were taken to tidy up bureaucratic arrangements at the local level. CPSU Central Committee resolutions during 1956-1958 did away with the Political Administrations of the railroads, militia, merchant fleet, and the machine-tractor stations—all of which had reported directly to the CPSU Central Committee apparatus in the past.<sup>15</sup> Henceforth, the party organizations in those fields were to be under the supervision of the appropriate regional party committee. Another resolution in August 1956 abolished the network of party organizers at the most important industrial enterprises and put the party organization at those sites under the supervision of the party committee for the rayon in which they were located.<sup>16</sup>

These steps contributed to some devolution of authority downward to the lower echelons of the party bureaucracy, but the reorganizations in 1962

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were in the direction of a recentralization. In March 1962, a reorganization of the management of agriculture brought into being a network of special party organizers attached to newly created collective farm/state farm production administrations and responsible to the appropriate party committee at the oblast, kray, or union-republic level. In July 1962, the rural rayon party committees were subordinated to the party organizers, and the first secretaries of these rayon committees began to serve as their deputies.

The recentralizing trend received another boost at the November 1962 CPSU Central Committee plenum, when the party bureaucracy was divided into two parts—one for industry; the other for agriculture.<sup>17</sup> Henceforth, all party organizations at industrial enterprises, construction sites, transportation and communications facilities, etc., were to be supervised by a hierarchy of industrial party committees. Party organizations at collective farms, state farms, and other agricultural enterprises were to be supervised by a similar hierarchy of agricultural party committees. Most rural rayon party committees were abolished, with their authority transferred to the agricultural production administration party committees, which were responsible to the appropriate oblast or kray agricultural party committee. The latter had their parallel in the oblast or kray industrial party committees with jurisdiction over the city, urban rayon, and industrial zone party committees in their area.

No figures are available on the impact of this reorganization, but it probably led to a further reduction in the number of paid workers assigned to the local party units—perhaps by as much as 10 percent. The increase in the number of kray and oblast party committees was more than offset by the decrease in the number of city party committees and in the number of administrative units—collective farm/state farm party committees, industrial zone party committees, and rayon party units. (Table I) It is noteworthy that there was an increase in the number of full-time officials assigned to the staffs of the local party units when the November 1962 reorganization was undone shortly after Khrushchev left office.<sup>18</sup>

The first point at which these separate hierarchies came together was at the union-republic level, where there was to be one central committee and one presidium. It was the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat and its bureaucracy in Moscow that once again gained by this reorganization. Three new CPSU Central Committee Bureaus were established with jurisdiction over agriculture, heavy industry and construction, and chemical and light industries. Two new CPSU Central Committee Commissions were set up—one to supervise party staffing and other organizational questions; the other to oversee ideological work. A Central Asian Bureau was created to supervise party work in Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia, and Turkmenistan, and a Transcaucasian Bureau was formed to coordinate party work in Armenia,

Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Meanwhile, the RSFSR Bureau found the scope of its jurisdiction narrowed with the creation of two other new CPSU Central Committee Bureaus—one to supervise industry in the Russian Republic; the second to direct agricultural work there.

### **Blurring of Party and Government Roles**

The 1962 reorganizations were apparently intended to increase the specialized production expertise of the party bureaucracy, with the rationale that this would improve its supervision of economic production. They also made for more duplication within the party, however, and did little to lessen the friction between party and government officials. As the party officials acquired more expertise in any given field, they tended to duplicate the work of those directly responsible for production in that sector of the economy. Their Soviet critics charged that these more expert party officials had a tendency to get sidetracked from their party role as political leaders responsible for teaching Marxism-Leninism, controlling personnel appointments, and checking on plan fulfillment. Differentiation between the roles of party and government officials became increasingly blurred.

This blurring was epitomized in November 1962 in the creation of a Committee of Party-State Control, subordinate to the CC/CPSU Secretariat (Khrushchev—1st Secretary) and to the USSR Council of Ministers (Khrushchev—Premier). The Committee was chaired by Party Secretary Shelepin, who doubled as a USSR Deputy Premier from November 1962 until December 1965. The local units also were chaired by people who were both party secretaries and deputy premiers (or the equivalent) of the corresponding echelon of the party and government bureaucracies. These officials were the only people in the USSR who simultaneously held executive posts in the party and the government. Although there is no direct evidence that they exercised control over the party bureaucracy as well as over the government and economic agencies, the committee's title implied that they did.

The 1962 reorganizations were also intended to reduce the power of the entrenched regional party leaders—especially those at the union republic, kray, and oblast levels. They added materially to the exasperation and uncertainty of those satraps, however, without effectively reducing their power. The 1962 reorganizations were a major factor contributing to the erosion of Khrushchev's support among his colleagues on the Presidium and in the CPSU Central Committee. Other issues also contributed to his ouster in October 1964, but the importance of the 1962 reorganizations is pointed up by the fact that their undoing was one of the first steps undertaken by the post-Khrushchev leadership.

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In sum, the Khrushchev years were marked by attempts to adjust the party to the requirements of an advanced industrial society. The party became more pragmatic and opened the doors to the idea that other areas of expertise might be at least as important as Marxism-Leninism. Its bureaucratic structure was rearranged to correlate with the new government structure managing the economy, and the roles of the two institutions—by long established practice kept separate—began to merge. Moreover, while the party membership was growing rapidly in size and in sophistication, both the numerical strength and the power of its full-time professional staff were reduced. Finally, career officials were kept on their toes by successive reorganization schemes and by intensive use of lateral transfers from oblast to oblast, rather than by Stalin's bloody purges. As a result, there was a weakening of the forces making for unity within the party and against those outside its ranks, and the groundwork appeared to have been laid for further changes spelling a major transformation in the power and character of the party.

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## FOOTNOTES

1. "Report of the Central Auditing Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)"; *Pravda*; October 7, 1952; p. 2.

2. "Report of the Central Auditing Commission of the CPSU to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—Report of Comrade P. G. Moskatov" in *Pravda*; February 16, 1956; pp. 1-2.

3. "Speech of Comrade M. A. Suslov at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" in *Pravda*; February 17, 1956; pp. 8-9.

4. "Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 20th Party Congress—Report by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev" in *Pravda*; February 15, 1956; pp. 1-11.

5. "On a Reduction of the Staffs of Obkoms, Kraykoms, and Central Committees of Communist Parties of Union-Republics." Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee dated March 21, 1956; *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika*, First Edition, 1957, p. 406. "On Changes in the Structure and Staff of the Apparatus of Rural Raykoms of the Party." Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee dated September 19, 1957; *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika*, Second Edition, 1959, p. 545. "On Several Simplifications of the Structure of the Apparatus and a Reduction of the Staffs of Gorkoms and Urban Raykoms of the Party." Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee dated October 11, 1957; *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika*, Second Edition, 1959, p. 546.

6. "Report of the Central Auditing Commission of the CPSU to the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—Report by Comrade A. F. Gorkin" in *The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Stenographic Report*, Vol. I, p. 137 (Moscow, 1962).

7. *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 24, December 1961, p. 12.

8. "Statutes of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," adopted at the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1952, Article 59. (Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1953).

9. These figures are based on the percentage figures for the primary party organizations with more than 100 members in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 1, January 1962, p. 54.

10. "Statutes of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," adopted at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1961, Article 56; *The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: A Stenographic Report*, Vol. III, p. 351 (Moscow, 1962).

11. "Statutes of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," adopted at the 22nd Congress of the Congress Party of the Soviet Union in 1961, Article 25; *The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: A Stenographic Report*, Vol. III, p. 344 (Moscow, 1962).

12. "Statutes of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," adopted at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1961, Article 26; *The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: A Stenographic Report*, Vol. III, pp. 344-345. (Moscow, 1962).

13. "On a Further Broadening of the Rights of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Union-Republics, of the Kray Party Committees, of the Oblast Party Committees, of the City Party Committees, of the Rayon Party Committees, and of the Primary Party Committees in Deciding Organizational-Party and Financial-Budgetary Questions." *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika*, Second Edition, 1959, pp. 555-556.

14. *Kommunist* No. 7, May 1962, pp. 61-64.

15. "Concerning the Abolition of the Political Administrations for Railroad Transportation," Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on March 21, 1956. "Concerning the Abolition of the Political Administrations of the Militia," Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on June 5, 1956. "Concerning the Political Organs of the USSR Ministry of the Maritime Fleet," Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on April 12, 1957. "On the Further Development of the Collective Farm System and a Re-organization of the Machine-Tractor Stations," Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on February 26, 1953. *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika*, First Edition, 1957, pp. 405, 408-409, 436-439; and Second Edition, 1959, pp. 154-160.

16. "Concerning the Party Organizations of the CPSU Central Committee," Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on August 17, 1956, *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika*, First Edition, 1957, p. 429.

17. "Concerning the Development of the Economy of the USSR and a Re-organization of Party Leadership of the National Economy," A Resolution of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee concerning the Report by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, adopted on November 23, 1962. *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika*, Fourth Edition, 1963, pp. 191-200.

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18. "Report of the Central Auditing Commission of the CPSU to the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," *The 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Stenographic Report*, p. 114. (Moscow, 1966).

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## II. The Party Apparatus Since Khrushchev

### Back to Regionalism

Khrushchev's successors lost little time in undoing the 1962 party reorganization. A month after Khrushchev's ouster at the October 1964 plenum, another plenum was held to approve a reunification of the party bureaucracy at the oblast and kray levels.<sup>1</sup> The agricultural production administration party units were reorganized into rayon party committees, and the industrial zone party committees were done away with. As a result, all civilian party committees within a kray, oblast, okrug, rayon, or city were again under the jurisdiction of the local party committee.<sup>2</sup> Once again, regional party leaders were to be generalists, not specialists. (Table I)

The November 1964 plenum apparently also approved the abolition of the special agencies that had been set up within the CPSU Central Committee apparatus after the November 1962 plenum. These included the Central Committee Bureaus for agriculture, heavy industry and construction, and chemical and light industry; the corresponding bureaus for agriculture and for industry and construction under the RSFSR Bureau; and the two Central Committee Bureaus overseeing party work in the four Central Asian and three Transcaucasian republics. They also included the two Central Committee Commissions that had been created in late 1962 to supervise party staffing and other organizational questions and to oversee ideological work.

References to them in the Soviet media ceased; their chiefs began to be identified in new posts; and the Central Committee departments that had been absorbed into these bureaus and commissions at the time of their formation reappeared.

In September 1965, another of Khrushchev's innovations—the organization of government management of the economy on a regional basis in the *sovnarkhozy*—was abolished and the centralized production branch ministries in Moscow re-established. Since the Central Committee departments were still organized essentially in parallel on a production branch basis, few changes were required at that level.

Consequently, when the 23rd Congress opened in March 1966, the organizational structure of the CPSU Central Committee was once again very similar to what it had been before Khrushchev had tinkered with it. The only major structural innovation that remained was the Bureau for the RSFSR, and that was to be dealt with shortly. The "Party Organs" departments had been renamed "Organizational-Party Work" departments, but continued to have the primary responsibility for the more sensitive appointments and for overseeing the day-to-day operations of the party, the Komsomol, and the



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trade unions. A few departments supervising sectors of the economy had been split to improve their efficiency, and departments that had disappeared into commissions reappeared, though with no major change in the role played by the party officials involved. (See Charts A and B)

#### **Limited Personnel Shakeup in the Central Apparatus**

The initial changes in the structure of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus were accompanied by a personnel shakeup, but it was not as extensive as the one that had been carried out in the initial post-Stalin period.

No more than two or three of the men who headed one of the dozen or so departments existing at the time of Stalin's death in March 1953 still held the same job a year and a half later. Six or seven departments existing in early 1966 had no chief at that time, in most cases because the department was about to go out of business, but in one or two instances because the Soviet leadership was unable to agree on who should have the job. The separate departments for the RSFSR were abolished after the 23rd Congress, in connection with the abolition of the RSFSR Bureau. The vacancies in the "Administrative Organs" and "Finance and Planning Organs" departments, however, appear to have been left unfilled because the top leaders could not agree on a nominee for the post.

Meanwhile, the heads of at least 12 of the some 30 to 40 departments had remained unchanged, and four others had been transferred from one to another department. Three former chiefs had been brought back, and five deputy chiefs—all with several years of service in the apparatus—had been promoted. Only five or six of the men heading a department had not been officials of the central party bureaucracy in the past, and less than half of the 12 to 15 new appointees appeared to have a close working relationship with any of the top Soviet leaders.

#### **Job Security for Regional Leaders**

The period leading up to the 23rd Congress was also marked by a greater measure of job security for the regional party leaders. In the RSFSR only 16 of the top 78 posts changed hands during the interval between Khrushchev's ouster and the opening of the 23rd Congress.<sup>3</sup> More important, perhaps, was the result of the RSFSR changes—half of the reassigned incumbents were subsequently moved into jobs that were at least as prestigious as the ones they had left. By way of contrast, during the comparable period leading up to the 22nd Congress in 1961, there had been 45 similar reassignments—in 30 of which the incumbent was transferred to a less important job or retired.

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The rate of turnover was higher in the minority republics with 49 of the 113 top party officials changing jobs, but only 23 were demoted or retired.<sup>4</sup> Most of the latter were in Kazakhstan or Armenia—the two republics whose first secretaries were ousted during this period—or in the Ukraine—the scene of constant infighting because of its heavy representation in the Kremlin.

There had been 47 such reassignments during the comparable period leading up to the 22nd Congress, and in 28 of those changes the official was demoted or retired.

The turnover quotas inserted into the party statutes at the 22nd Congress, however, remained a sore issue with the regional party leaders.<sup>5</sup> The quotas generated confusion, particularly at the lower levels of the party bureaucracy. Although some of the turnover in party secretaries and in the make-up of local party bureaus or committees involved little more than reshuffling people from one post to another, even this disrupted the party units involved. The turnover quotas also led to a large influx of new and inexperienced people into the party bureaucracy—and this, too, was a sore point with veteran party officials.<sup>6</sup>

#### Greater Rights for Local Party Organizations

Another sore point was the allocation of seats on local party bureaus or committees to economic or other state officials on an *ex officio* basis.<sup>7</sup> There were some complaints about party leaders who refused to permit any airing of differences lest this undermine their authority, or who continued to hold “enlarged” plenums or aktiv meetings in place of regular plenums to prevent the discussion of the items on the agenda from leading to criticism of their own actions.<sup>8</sup> For the most part, however, Moscow allowed the local party organizations to work out their own solutions with a minimum of interference from higher-ups.

This renewed emphasis on the rights of local units was reflected in most of the changes that were made in the party statutes at the 23rd Congress.<sup>9</sup> One of the most important amendments was the abolition of the turnover quotas. The concept of systematic turnover in the membership of the party bureaus or committees, and among the party secretaries at the various levels of the apparatus, was endorsed in principle, but the implementation was to be governed by specific local conditions, not by guidelines drafted in Moscow.

Another amendment granted the committees of primary party organizations with over 1,000 members the authority of a rayon party committee on questions such as accepting people into the party, registering them as

candidate or full members, and investigating cases bearing on their membership within the party.<sup>10</sup> Party committees could be established, where necessary, in the workshops at the enterprises with those large primary party organizations, with smaller units acquiring the rights of a primary party organization. Another amendment stipulated that party committees could be set up at state farms with only 50 communists, as was already the case at collective farms.<sup>11</sup>

These changes were intended to strengthen the party apparatus at the grass-roots level—where the party comes into contact with the nonparty population—and contributed to an increase in the number of party committees as well as the number of primary party organizations, shop organizations, and party groups. In most cases, however, the increase in the number of party units has been at a slower rate than it had been during Khrushchev's last years in office. Only the increase in the number of primary party organizations has been at a higher annual rate than it had been under Khrushchev, and it also has recently dropped below the annual rate during the interval between the 22nd Congress and Khrushchev's ouster. (Table I) The party organizations at the grass-roots level have continued to grow, but the increase in size here also has been slower than it had been during the Khrushchev years and has not been uniform across the board. The average membership of the primary party organizations at industrial enterprises, collective farms, and scientific institutions has increased since January 1965, but the party units at construction sites and state farms have, on the average, become smaller. (Table II)

Another amendment allowed primary party organizations with up to 300 communists, and with shop or other subdivisions, to hold their general membership meetings once every two months, rather than at least once a month, as in the past. In addition, the interval between the congresses of union-republic party organizations was doubled, from two to four years—the interval between national party congresses at that time. Both changes would appear to have been in keeping with the interests of the local party officials most directly involved in the seemingly endless task of preparing themselves for those meetings and congresses. Meanwhile, the primary party organizations with less than 50 communists, and without any shop or other subdivisions, were to continue to hold general membership meetings at least once a month. Those with more than 300 communists were to convene a general membership meeting when necessary at times fixed by the party committee, or on the demand of a number of the shop or other subunits.

Yet another amendment restored the right of the CPSU Central Committee to convoke a national party conference during the interval between congresses, and gave union-republic central committees the right to convoke similar conferences at that level when necessary.<sup>12</sup> Such conferences could

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provide a forum for a broader discussion of major issues than would be possible at subsequent Central Committee plenums, especially at the national level. The most recent national party conference—the 18th, in February 1941—was a six-day affair attended by 456 voting and 138 nonvoting delegates, and 59 people participated in the discussions of the reports delivered by Party Secretary Malenkov and by Deputy Premier Voznesensky. It was very similar to the “expanded” plenums held from time to time under Khrushchev, and quite different from the post-Khrushchev plenums. None of the latter lasted more than three days, and most have been one-day affairs. Only a few people who were not Central Committee members or candidate members or Central Auditing Commission members have attended them, and none had as many as 30 people participating in the discussion; in most, less than 20 people have been given an opportunity to do so.

Such party conferences also could provide an opportunity for making substantial changes in the top leadership, or in the membership of the central committee and auditing commission of the party organization in question. The 18th conference, for example, not only discussed major issues concerning the preparations for the war that the USSR was to be dragged into four months later, but also brought the addition of Malenkov, Voznesensky, and Moscow party chief Shcherbakov to the ruling Politburo as candidate members. It also replaced nearly 15 percent of the people who had been seated on the CPSU Central Committee or the CPSU Central Auditing Commission at the 18th Congress only two years earlier. The extent of this “bloodless” purge in early 1941 suggests that one of the reasons for the revival of the national party conference in 1939 had been the desire to have a means of achieving turnover in the hierarchy without resorting to the bloodshed that had accompanied the Great Purge. This impression is reinforced by the fact that the national party conferences were again done away with at a time when Stalin apparently was planning another major purge in late 1952.

More important, however, in the past such sessions provided regional party leaders a better opportunity than they usually had at plenums to advance their views and to protect their interests. Regional party leaders are usually outnumbered by the party and government officials stationed in the capital where the plenum is held. The regional party leaders would have a great deal to say, however, about the composition of the delegations to a party conference. As in the case of party congresses, delegates are selected by the individual regional party organizations. Although the selecting is supervised by party officials in the respective capital, it gives the regional party leaders an excellent opportunity to “pack” the delegations which they head—an opportunity not available to those stationed in the capital, especially those working for the government or elsewhere outside the party bureaucracy. The presence of such “support” among the voting delegates at a party conference might not make regional party leaders any more daring

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when it comes to launching initiatives opposed by the top leadership, but it would make it somewhat easier for the regional leaders to rally opposition against proposals threatening their interests.

### Regionalization Continues

The 23rd Congress renamed the CPSU Presidium the Politburo, altered Brezhnev's title from First Secretary to General Secretary, and abolished the CPSU Central Committee's Bureau for the RSFSR. All three changes had implications for leadership politics, but the demise of the RSFSR Bureau also represented another success for those favoring greater autonomy for regional party organizations. It certainly did little to advance the interests of the Moscow officials supervising the party organizations in the RSFSR. A number of people who had been officials of the departments under the RSFSR Bureau transferred to the appropriate CPSU Central Committee departments. It can be assumed that the majority of the officials of the RSFSR departments were reassigned in this fashion during the months following the congress, but the traditional reluctance of the Soviet authorities to announce such shifts makes it impossible to arrive at any hard figures on the number of officials transferred and the nature of those transfers.

In most cases, the reassigned officials carried their former areas of responsibility to their new posts. Few, if any, however, gained a promotion; the chiefs of the RSFSR departments became deputy chiefs of the revamped CPSU Central Committee departments, and lesser lights did well to avoid a corresponding drop in status. This trend was in sharp contrast to the one during the last few months before the 23rd Congress, when four of the five RSFSR department chiefs—or the equivalent—who had changed jobs had moved into even more important posts in the central party bureaucracy.

At least equally important was the failure of the 23rd Congress to approve a proposal calling for the creation of "directorates and departments of cadres in local party organs and in the party Central Committee."<sup>13</sup> Concentrating in one apparatus the selection, placement, and training of personnel for all sectors of work—in the party, the government, the economic bureaucracy, and the other public institutions and organizations—would have laid the groundwork for yet another major reorganization of the party bureaucracy. Such changes would have shifted the party's focus to personnel matters and major political questions—not day-to-day supervision of the government bureaucracy, economic enterprises, and public institutions—and would have made it more difficult for the party to exercise control over the implementation of its decisions. Moreover, it would have run counter to the just-completed reorganization of the government structure with the September 1965 re-establishment of central production branch ministries.

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### Continuing Job Security in the Party

Party officials continued to enjoy a relatively high degree of job security during the period between the 23rd and 24th congresses, despite all the emphasis on discipline. Only 10 of the 40 top posts in the central party bureaucracy changed hands during that five-year interval; three of the reassigned officials moved into an equally or more important job; and half of the new appointees were people moving up from within the CPSU Central Committee apparatus. The rate of turnover was higher among the regional party leaders, but well below anything bordering on a major shakeup. Although 35 of the 78 top posts in the RSFSR changed hands, only 23 reassigned leaders failed to obtain an equally or more important job, and only eight vacancies were filled by people brought in from outside the party organization in question. Fifty-eight of the 121 top posts in the other union republics changed hands,<sup>14</sup> but only 28 reassigned leaders did not move into an equally or more important post. By the same token, 15 of the 27 vacancies filled by an "outsider" were either republic second secretary slots traditionally occupied by Moscow's man on the local scene or posts in newly created regional party commands.<sup>15</sup>

### Career Stability

Stability remained the watchword during the initial period after the 24th Congress. Local party units were taken to task for having too much turnover in the membership of their committees, or in their secretaries, not for having made too few changes.<sup>16</sup> Although the wisdom of promoting deserving young officials was mentioned from time to time,<sup>17</sup> the authorities in Moscow continued to insist upon a proper combination of "senior, experienced cadres with young workers" and warned local units against the idea that "when you reach a certain age—go into retirement."<sup>18</sup> Meanwhile, the practice of promoting people up from within a given party organization continued to be observed in most cases; dispatching people from "the center" to take over a key position in a local party organization was seldom resorted to, and cases of cross-posting an official from one regional command to another were almost as rare.

### How Much Stability Is Too Much?

The period since July 1973, however, has been marked by a shift in the public discussions of a number of these questions, and the rate of turnover in key party posts has increased, especially in the smaller minority republics (Table III). Although the first secretaries of only 48 kray or oblast party organizations have been replaced since the 24th Congress, 25 of these changes have come since July 1973<sup>19</sup>—as have 31 of the 53 other post-congress moves involving key positions at the republic level or in the most

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important city party organizations,<sup>20</sup> and four of the five changes in the CPSU Central Committee apparatus. Even with these changes, however, the post-congress total comes to less than the figure for the comparable interval after the 23rd Congress—a period of hitherto unprecedented stability for the party hierarchy. More important, perhaps, is the likelihood that the lack of upward mobility has begun to have an adverse effect on the morale of party functionaries; the efficiency of the party bureaucracy probably also has decreased because many top officials are too old to do a full day's work.

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## FOOTNOTES

1. "On the Re-unification of Industrial and Rural Oblast and Kray Party Organizations," A Resolution of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on November 16, 1964. *Spravochnik Partinogo Rabotnika*, Sixth Edition (Moscow, 1966) p. 101.

2. The party organizations within the armed forces have a separate bureaucratic structure under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces, which is supervised by the CPSU Secretariat and has the authority of a department of the CPSU Central Committee.

3. Included in these 78 posts were the first and second secretaries of the Moscow oblast and city party organizations; the first and second secretaries of the Leningrad oblast and city party organizations; and the first secretaries of the 70 other krays, oblasts, and autonomous republics within the RSFSR. The number of people reassigned excludes those who were squeezed out of such jobs when 44 posts were abolished during the re-unification of the kray and oblast party committees; the latter, for the most part, had moved up to this echelon after the party re-organization in late 1962, and their relegation to less important posts was fully in keeping with the interests of the regional party leaders from the old school.

4. Included in these 113 posts were the first and second secretaries in the 14 minority union republics; the other republic party secretaries, and the first secretaries of the party organizations in the capitals of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan; and the first secretaries of all oblast or autonomous republic party organizations in any of the minority union republics. The number of reassigned incumbents excludes the people who were squeezed out when 26 posts were done away with during the party re-organization in late 1964.

5. See, for example, the article by N. Kotov and B. Shevchenko in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 16, August 1965; the editorial in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 17, September 1965; and the speech by Rostov Oblast first secretary M. S. Solomentsev at the March 1965 plenum (made public only when the stenographic report for that session appeared in September 1965) in *Plenum Tsentralnogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 24-26 Marta 1965 Goda: Stenograficheskii Otchet* (Moscow, 1965) pp. 114-121.

6. See, for example, the *Pravda* editorial on August 20, 1965; Brezhnev's speech at the September 1965 plenum (as published in *Pravda* on September 30, 1965); and the article by Moscow city party first secretary N. G. Yegorychev in *Pravda* on October 4, 1965.



7. See, for example, the article by F. Petrenko in *Kommunist* No. 18, December 1965, pp. 36-42; the article by I. Naidis in the same issue, pp. 43-49; and the one by V. Zasorin in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 1, January 1966, pp. 28-36.

8. V. Zasorin, *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 1, January 1966, pp. 28-36.

9. "Resolution of the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union concerning Partial Changes in the CPSU Statutes" adopted on April 8, 1966. *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika*, Sixth Edition (Moscow, 1966) pp. 25-27. (The changes concerning admission to and expulsion from the party, and the responsibilities that go with party membership, have already been discussed in the section dealing with party membership growth patterns during the post-Khrushchev period.)

10. By July 1967, such rights had been granted to 449 party committees; by January 1973, 694 primary party organizations had been granted such authority. (The figure for 1967 is from *Kommunist* No. 15, October 1967, p. 102; the figure from 1973 is from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, p. 23.)

11. Paragraph 57 of the party statutes adopted at the 22nd Congress had stipulated that such party committees could be established at factories and offices with more than 300 party members and candidate members, and in exceptional cases at those with only 100 communists, and at collective farms with at least 50 communists. It had said nothing, however, about the minimum size that a party organization at a state farm would have to achieve before it could set up such a party committee. Whatever the reason for the failure to provide such a guideline in 1961, the amendment adopted in 1966 resulted in a sharp increase in the number of state farm party organizations with party committees. They numbered but 3,827 in early 1965 (a little under 38 percent of the state farms then in operation), but had increased to 8,638 by early 1968 (approximately two thirds of the state farms existing at that time), and to roughly 10,000 by early 1973 (again, approximately two thirds of the state farms in operation). (The figures for the number of primary party organizations with party committees are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 10, May 1965, p. 16; *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 7, April 1968, p. 28; and *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, p. 23. The figures for the number of state farms are from *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo SSSR: Statisticheskii Yezhegodnik* 1964, p. 408; 1967, p. 480; and 1973, p. 468.)

12. National party conferences had been convoked at regular intervals until the 17th Congress in 1934, when the practice was done away with as unobtrusively as possible. The CPSU Central Committee regained the right to convoke such gatherings at the 18th Congress in 1939, but lost it again at the 19th Congress in 1952. Such meetings had been unnecessary at the republic level, where party congresses were to have been held every two years.

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13. This proposal was advanced by Novosibirsk Oblast first secretary F. S. Goryachev at the morning session on March 30, 1966, but did not receive support from any of the other speakers at the congress. It drew a sharply negative response from Estonian republic party chief I. G. Kebin on April 2. Kebin expressed the opinion that "the selection and training of leading cadres is primarily the responsibility of organs responsible for various sectors of work, and not of a special cadres directorate."

14. The increase from 113 to 121 during the period between the 23rd and 24th congresses is due to the creation of eight additional oblasts during that interval.

15. Seven republic second secretary slots that changed hands during the period between the 23rd and 24th congresses were traditionally held by party officials who had been sent in from outside the republic to act as Moscow's representative there.

16. *Pravda*, September 18, 1971. (Report by M. Vasin and M. Stepichev on the work of the Leningrad Oblast party organization.)

17. See, for example, the article by Leningrad Oblast first secretary Romanov in *Kommunist* No. 5, March 1972, and the article by Sakhalin Oblast first secretary P. A. Leonov in *Kommunist* No. 18, December 1971.

18. *Pravda*, September 18, 1971.

19. Although 55 such party organizations have elected a new first secretary since the 24th Congress, seven are in newly created oblasts.

20. The republic posts are the first, second, and other secretaries of the republic central committees; the Ukraine and Kazakhstan have six such republic level posts, and the other union-republics have five. The city posts are the first secretary jobs in the republic capitals.

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### III. Closing Pandora's Box—with Difficulty

The 1962 bifurcation of the party bureaucracy was undone within weeks of Khrushchev's ouster, but other questions raised during his tenure as First Secretary generated public debate in the Soviet press for months afterwards.

One of the main issues was that of the proper work of party organizations and differentiation between party and state functions. Lower level party officials were divided on whether their work should be primarily "political"—teaching Marxism-Leninism, controlling personnel appointments, and checking up on plan fulfillment—or "economic"—involving them in day-to-day managerial decisions at a farm or factory in a concrete effort to improve production.<sup>1</sup> If party organizations were to be limited to a "political" role, differentiation between party and state functions could be fairly easily arranged, but managerial decisions affecting the rise or fall of production would be made by state, not party, organs. This would sharply limit the party's control of the economic process.

If the choice was to be an "economic" role, however, it would be all but impossible to avoid "duplication of" or "substitution for" the various state organs making decisions in exactly the same area. Moreover, if a party official was to concern himself intimately with problems requiring increasingly specialized knowledge, he would have to be equipped with the required expertise. The issue of the proper content of party work and the separation of party and state functions thus focused primarily on the party bureaucracy's relationship to experts in economic, industrial, and agricultural fields.

Another issue emerged as the political scientists and sociologists also bid for status as "experts." Most of these social scientists conceived of their role as properly independent of traditional party doctrine.<sup>2</sup> The role of the party, in their view, was to provide guidelines in the selection of problems for investigation and make use of the results of that research—as it did in the case of the physical scientists. There were also suggestions that the party apparatus itself should undertake research in the social field, and this raised the possibility of yet another choice—whether the content of party work should be "political," or "economic," and/or embrace sociological research.<sup>3</sup> The last named option could have been congenial to some proponents of the "political" content school, but it was likely to have far-reaching implications for Marxist-Leninist doctrine. It would have meant subjecting the ideology to continued questioning, re-examination, and alteration—not just by the political leaders, as in the past, but also by the "sociological experts."

Friction between the generations was apparent in the discussions of the so-called "renovation" clauses inserted into the party statutes in 1961. The

clauses provided for systematic turnover of the personnel in the various party posts by limiting the number of terms which an individual could serve consecutively. The eligibility requirements for election to office at the primary party organization level had been lowered at the same time; and, judging from the complaints being voiced in the press in mid-1965, a large number of inexperienced youngsters had replaced their elders in party posts at this level.<sup>4</sup>

The fourth key issue in the debate related to the problem of internal party discipline and the principle of democratic centralism. Attempts to deal with the issue of "justified" dissent produced "solutions" that were no more convincing than previous attempts had been, and they gave no clear guidelines to a younger generation bred on more than a decade of successive "revelations" of "errors" on the part of party leaders who, when in power, had been treated as infallible. One discussion of this question, however, did conclude acidly that it was impossible to justify those Communists, especially the (unnamed) leaders, who had enthusiastically implemented the obviously incorrect and stereotyped "recommendations" in Khrushchev's anti-grasslands campaign.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the issue of individual conscience and personal responsibility was squarely put, and the door to justified opposition to party policy was opened wide. Not surprisingly, this drew a retort a month later in an article that focused strongly on the duty of every Communist, "even a secretary of the central committee," to obey to the letter and without question "all decisions of the Central Committee."<sup>6</sup> There was some evidence that these issues were becoming subjects of controversy in the Kremlin and factors in the struggle for power. The debate was thus much more than an exercise in theoretical discourse; it was the visible evidence of the concrete and far-reaching choices that the Soviet leadership would have to grapple with during the ensuing decade.

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## FOOTNOTES

1. Examples of the argument for a "political" role are found in: *Pravda* editorials on November 18, 1964 and December 6, 1964; an article by V. Orlov in *Kommunist Ukrainy* No. 1, January 1965; an article by A. Lepeshkin in *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo* No. 2, February 1965; an essay by V. Shapko in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 3, March 1965; an article by V. Stepanov in *Pravda* on May 17, 1965; another by M. Gavrilov in *Izvestia* on June 18, 1965; and a *Pravda* editorial on June 28, 1965. Examples of the argument for having party organizations play an "economic" role are found in: the editorials in *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* on November 18, 1964 and on March 31, 1965; the editorials in *Izvestia* on May 21 and 22, 1965; the editorial in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* on May 29, 1965; an article by S. Podorvanov in *Pravda* on June 9, 1965; and another by K. Nikolayev in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* on June 16, 1965.

2. The brief for the political scientists and sociologists was argued by F. Burlatsky in *Pravda* on January 9, 1965, and by A. Bovin in the armed forces' daily, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, on February 10, 1965. It was opposed by F. Konstantinov and V. Kelle in *Kommunist* No. 1, January 1965 and by an editorial in *Kommunist* No. 4, March 1965.

3. See, for example, N. Ovchinnikov, Ye. Lisavtsev, and V. Maslin in *Pravda* on May 11, 1965; K. Nikolayev in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* on June 16, 1965; and A. Svetsitsky in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* on July 3, 1965.

4. See, for example, A. Putrya's article in *Pravda* on May 25, 1965, as well as the above-mentioned piece by G. Popov. The best evidence of the generational conflict, however, is found in the speech that Georgian party first secretary V. Mzhavanadze delivered in Tbilisi on June 25, 1965, at a plenum of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee—a speech that was embargoed for four days before it was broadcast over Radio Tbilisi.

5. *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 10, May 1965, pp. 3-10.

6. N. Lomakin, *Partinaya Zhizn* No 12, June 1965, pp. 70-73.

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#### IV. The Party and the State

##### Separation of Party and State Control

The Committee of Party-State Control and its local subsidiary units were a considerable irritant to party officials.<sup>1</sup> Not only was there confusion over the jurisdictions of local party-state control units and local party committees, but party-state control units had embarrassed local party committees by uncovering problems caused by shortcomings in the latter's work. Worst of all, as a hybrid party-government organization, the committee appeared to claim the right to review party work from outside the party's chain of command, and thus to present a challenge to the party's political supremacy.

At the CPSU Central Committee plenum held in December 1965, a decision was announced to transform the Party-State Control Committee into a Committee of People's Control under the USSR Council of Ministers.<sup>2</sup> The officials of the People's Control Committee were to have no authority over the party bureaucracy; their role was to be limited to controlling the manner in which government agencies, economic organizations, and enterprises and farms fulfilled the directives issued by the party and the government. The local committees were actually to operate along the lines of the other mass organizations on the local scene—bringing a number of rank-and-file citizens into some of the action in running things, but without any real power vis-a-vis local party officials. None of the officials of the People's Control units were to have any standing in the party bureaucracy, and a number of local chairmen found themselves relegated to candidate membership on local party committees, or excluded entirely from those bodies.

Responsibility for controlling the party bureaucracy was returned to the CPSU Committee of Party Control, which had been relatively inactive since late 1962 when it had been transformed into a commission.<sup>3</sup> This body regained its former status as a committee shortly after the December 1965 plenum, and the period following the 23rd Congress was marked by increased activity on the part of the CPSU Party Control Committee and the party control commissions attached to the republic, kray, oblast, city and rayon party committees. These units were told to investigate the circumstances leading up to violations of the party statutes and party ethics, and to make recommendations on how to prevent future violations.<sup>4</sup> They began to crack down on local party officials who either had themselves been guilty of such behavior, or had failed to punish it in others. Party control units also began to pay closer attention to the manner in which local party committees responded to letters, statements, and complaints—acting as a court of last resort for party members who felt that their rights had been infringed on by local officials.

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At a lower level, efforts were made to re-invigorate the commissions created by primary party organizations to check on the fulfillment of party decisions by government officials at factories, construction sites, and farms.<sup>5</sup> These commissions were responsible for finding ways to increase the influence of the primary party organizations on economic matters. Local party committees were, however, warned against expanding their efforts to other fields, such as introducing new technology, physical culture and sports, combating crime, and city beautification projects.<sup>6</sup> They were also warned against setting up party organs staffed by unpaid volunteers who would only be duplicating the work done by the various non-party agencies.

A number of the CPSU Central Committee resolutions adopted during the first few years after the 23rd Congress provided insights into the effort to separate the roles of party units and government agencies. The party units were to develop a proper sense of values among the Soviet population,<sup>7</sup> supervise the training and placement of people in politically sensitive jobs,<sup>8</sup> and check up on how the other agencies were carrying out the policies decided upon by the top leadership.<sup>9</sup> They were to exercise political "leadership" of those agencies through the party members working there—that is, through the primary party organizations, rather than by issuing orders to the government officials. A territorial party committee was to rely on subordinate party organizations and on the specialists working for the other public institutions and organizations—not try to decide everything itself.

The re-establishment in 1965 of the strong central ministries in Moscow still complicated the party chain of command. Under the CPSU statutes adopted at the 22nd Congress in 1961, "party organizations at ministries, state committees, economic councils and other central and local government agencies and departments [were to] inform the appropriate party bodies in good time of shortcomings in the work of the respective offices and individuals, regardless of what posts the latter may occupy." Other articles adopted at the same time made it clear that such reports were to progress upward through the pipeline, from the primary party organizations to the rayon, city or okrug units to the oblast, kray or republic units and then to the CPSU Central Committee.<sup>10</sup>

This was all well and good for the decentralized government structure that Khrushchev had envisaged, but the party committee of the re-centralized USSR Ministry of Heavy Power and Transport Machine Building, for example, forms a part of a Moscow city rayon party organization. A rayon party committee secretary would be badly outranked by the minister—a full member of the Central Committee—and at a considerable disadvantage in attempting to criticize the ministry's performance.

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In early February 1970, a CPSU Central Committee resolution indicated that the central party bureaucracy was to exercise a greater measure of direct control over the party committees at ministries and other state agencies, bypassing the local party committees that had formal jurisdiction under the statutes. The resolution announced that the CPSU Central Committee "considers it intolerable that the party committee does not, as is required by the CPSU statutes, punctually inform the Central Committee about shortcomings in the work of the ministry and also of individual workers, regardless of the post they occupy."<sup>11</sup>

### Congress and Five Year Plans Synchronized

On Brezhnev's initiative, the 24th Congress approved an amendment to the party statutes extending the intervals between party congresses and between lesser party meetings.<sup>12</sup> National party congresses were to be held at five, rather than four-year intervals, so that they would coincide with the five-year plan periods. Actually, the frequency proviso had not been observed in the past, and the lengthening of the interval between the national party congresses amounted to an ex post facto approval of previous practice.

Republic party congresses were also to be held every five years, rather than every four years in the republics subdivided into oblasts, and every two years in the republics without such subdivisions. Kray, oblast, okrug, city, and rayon party conferences were to be held twice within the five-year period, rather than once every two years. Primary organizations with party committees had their schedules changed in the same fashion, but other local party units were to continue to hold their conferences on a yearly basis.

### Party Influence in Planning and Design Institutes

Another amendment to the Party statutes, also adopted in response to a Brezhnev proposal, materially broadened the party's formal right to interfere in the work of state and other agencies.<sup>13</sup> It extended the provision in the statutes concerning the right to supervise the activities of management personnel to the primary party organizations of all planning offices and design bureaus, research institutes, educational establishments, cultural, educational, health, and other institutions and organizations—putting those party units on a par with the ones at production enterprises. It also gave the primary party organizations in ministries, state committees, and other central and local government and economic institutions and departments the right to control work of the officials there in carrying out the directives of the party and the government, and in ensuring the observance of Soviet laws. Although these primary party organizations would still have somewhat less control than their counterparts in other organizations, the amendment was a victory for the party bureaucracy over the government.

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### Party Organizations in Production Associations

The same amendment also granted union republic, kray, and oblast party units the right to approve the formation of a primary party organization at the production association level when the enterprises belonging to the association are located in a single rayon, or in several rayons but within the boundaries of a given city. Most of the production associations could point to at least 1,000 party members working at the enterprises under the associations, and therefore could apply for "rayon status" for their party committees, as permitted by the change in the party statutes at the 23rd Congress. This innovation was a departure from the administrative-territorial chain of command for the civilian party organizations—the restoration of which had been one of the first steps taken by the post-Khrushchev leadership—and it must have run counter to the interests of many local party officials. On the other hand, the formation of "integrated" primary party organizations would strengthen the power of the party leaders in the areas where the headquarters of the production associations are located.

It is noteworthy that this segment of the amendment was not proposed by Brezhnev in his report at the opening session of the congress. Although Brezhnev did mention the "integrated" primary party organizations, as well as the creation of railroad junction party committees and the experiment with "expanded" party committees, in a brief comment on measures that had been taken in recent years to improve the structure of the primary party organizations, he said nothing about amending the party statutes to legalize any of these innovations. Instead, it was Leningrad Oblast first secretary G. V. Romanov who pushed hardest, in public, for this particular segment of the amendment.<sup>14</sup>

### Bureau for an Expanded Party Committee Denied

Sverdlovsk Oblast first secretary Ya. P. Ryabov had less success with his proposal that the party statutes be amended to approve the creation of "expanded" party committees—an innovation that had received favorable coverage in *Pravda* in October 1970.<sup>15</sup> The *Pravda* report had noted that an increase in the membership of the party committee from 11 to 49 people, 25 of whom were "workers," had made it possible for the committee to set up permanent commissions for control of economic activities, for organizational-party work, and for ideological work. This expansion, in turn, had led to the introduction of a new organizational link—the "bureau of the enlarged party committee." This "bureau" was to assume most of the leadership functions exercised by the party committee in the past. A party committee composed of approximately 50 members would be too unwieldy to convene on short notice or during work hours, and it would be much too large to make decisions on the day-to-day operations of the party organization at the factory.

The creation of a "bureau of the enlarged party committee" meant the actual leadership organ at the factory would no longer be elected directly by the members of the party organization there, but by the members of the "enlarged party committee." The rayon party officials would certainly find it easier to manipulate these elections—especially when the "enlarged party committee" was, for the most part, made up of the "foremost workers" and party activists among the several hundred or thousand party members at the factory. On the other hand, it would put those factory party officials—once elected—on a more even footing with the rayon officials. Like the latter, the factory party officials would be members of a "bureau," not just members of a committee. In addition, an "enlarged party committee" probably would be set up only at a factory where the party membership was large enough for the party committee to petition for the rights of a rayon committee. Ryabov's proposal concerning "expanded party committees" was ignored both in the amendments to the party statutes and in the resolution that was adopted on Brezhnev's report to the 24th Congress.

#### **Primary Party Organizations in Enterprise Shops**

On the other hand, the amendment on primary party organizations permitted party committees to be formed in large shops at enterprises where the primary party organization has over 500 communists, and allowed the party organizations of smaller production units at those enterprises to acquire the rights of a primary organization. This segment of the amendment also was adopted without having been proposed by Brezhnev, or by any other speakers at the Congress for that matter. Here, too, the net result was a further strengthening of the party bureaucracy at the grass-roots level—especially in the ministries and other government and economic agencies newly subjected to control by their primary party organizations.

#### **Problems with Production Associations...**

The new guidelines for creating shop party committees and for granting party units in smaller production components the rights of a primary organization appear to have caused few, if any problems, since the 24th Congress. The creation of additional production associations has created a number of problems, however, because many associations include enterprises situated in different cities, and sometimes in more than one oblast.<sup>16</sup> In these circumstances, it is impossible to set up a single "integrated" party organization at the association level, and special measures are necessary to ensure efficient communications between the party organizations at the enterprises within the association. One recommended solution is the creation of a "Council of Party Secretaries" which would meet at the same time as the association's "Council of Directors," but there has been little progress in setting up such councils.<sup>17</sup> In the meantime, the town and rayon party committees have frequently lost interest in an enterprise soon after its transfer to the control of a head factory located in another area.<sup>18</sup>

...And With Scientific Institutions

The decision giving party organizations more control over scientific, educational, cultural, medical, and other institutions has also caused problems since the 24th Congress. The party organizations at such institutions had always been extremely important, but now had the right to get involved in every aspect of the work of the institutions—not just an obligation to “try to influence” that work, much of which had fallen outside their competence in the past. They could now issue decrees “obliging” administrators to correct shortcomings—not just point out those shortcomings to the administrators. Directors and other administrators have since been accused of obstructing the work of party officials and of regarding every attempt of the party to exercise closer control as “an encroachment on their authority.”<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, some party workers have failed to “correctly understand or skillfully make use of this right of control.”<sup>20</sup>

Both sides have been reminded that the enhanced right of control does not mean that the administrators are either “suspect” or in need of constant supervision. There must be no “setting of the party collective against the administration,” no “infringement on the rights of the administration,” and no “cancellation of the principles of one-man management.” Nevertheless, there has been a great deal of confusion over how the party officials are to go about supervising the administrators without violating these precepts. One local party official complained in *Pravda* on February 9, 1972, that local newspapers failed to say anything about concrete practice in this area, and allowed the question of how to implement the right of control to remain hidden “behind a facade of general phrases.”

There has been less public evidence of tensions between the party officials and the executives working at the ministries, state committees, and other government or economic institutions. This may have been partly because the party secretary at a ministry or any other state or economic agency usually has held an administrative post there, and expects to do so again after completing his term in the party job. And, as at the enterprises having party secretaries at the shop or departmental level, secretaries of party units at lower echelons in ministries and other government or economic institutions are not full-time party officials, but people who spend most of the working day at their regular jobs. They thus have a vested interest in remaining on good terms with the top executives at their place of employment. This may explain in part why so many CPSU Central Committee resolutions adopted during the initial post-congress period reminded party officials to control the government executives and other administrators and managers.<sup>21</sup> By gradually widening the sphere of party intervention in such matters, party officials were becoming more involved in “practical,” as distinguished from “political” work.

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The initial post-congress period also brought changes in the training given people being groomed for responsible positions in the party apparatus. The study of theoretical problems and party policy was tied in more closely with experience derived from "building communism" and with specific tasks for the future. Curriculums, syllabuses, and instructional and methodological materials were reworked to provide a greater measure of differentiation in their level of sophistication and to tailor them more closely to the interests of the students, as determined by their production and sociopolitical activities.<sup>22</sup> In addition, a good deal of the actual instruction was transferred to the more advanced enterprises, research institutes, and similar places; it was no longer conducted solely at the party schools in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and other major cities.<sup>23</sup>

Party organizations at enterprises and institutions were also adjured to get managers and substantive experts to participate actively in the agitation programs at those sites.<sup>24</sup> Here, too, the net result was an increase in the extent to which "political" work was focused along "practical" lines. When factory directors or engineering and technical workers undertake educational work, it not unnaturally concerns measures taken to meet production goals. Although some sociopolitical issues—for example, the struggle for labor discipline, and against drunkenness and hooliganism—may be touched upon during their lectures, most receive little attention.

Meanwhile, CPSU Central Committee resolutions on economic questions and related matters have continued to call for party organizations to get deeply involved in the day-to-day work at the enterprise or office and to tighten their control over the administrative staff at the location in question.<sup>25</sup> Rather than undertake any fundamental change in the structure of the economy or the rules under which it operates, the party leaders have continued to nibble at the governmental bureaucracy's control over the economy while gradually widening the sphere of party intervention.

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### FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, the editorial in *Pravda* on July 6, 1965.
2. "On the Transformation of the Organs of Party-State Control," A Resolution of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on December 6, 1965. *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika*, Sixth Edition (Moscow, 1966) p. 120.
3. There was no formal announcement of the change then, or when the committee regained its former status in late 1965. In both cases, however, the change became evident shortly after plenums dealing with the Committee of Party-State Control.
4. These and other guidelines for the activity of the party control units were discussed at a seminar in Moscow in April 1967, and reported on in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 10, May 1967. Specific cases were reported on, from time to time, in announcements published in *Partinaya Zhizn*.
5. See, for example, the article by Leningrad Oblast Second Secretary G. V. Romanov in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 11, June 1967, pp. 14-22; and the article by I. Zaytsev and I. Pronin in issue No. 14, July 1967, pp. 30-35. The latter complained that there had been a "clear underevaluation" of these commissions in some places, commenting that "if several years ago there were more than 100,000 commissions in party organizations with over 600,000 communists in them implementing the right to check up on the activity of the administrations, then at present there are fewer of them."
6. This point was made in a report on recent developments within local party organizations, in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 16, August 1967, pp. 58-60.
7. "On the Work of the Party Committee of the Orekhov Cotton-fabric Combine named after K. I. Nikolayev;" A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on November 28, 1966; and "On the Work of the Party Organizations in Tula Oblast in Educating the Labor Force at Factories and Construction Sites in Labor Discipline;" A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on December 9, 1966. Published in *KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh Syezdov, Konferentsii i Plenumov TsK* (Moscow, 1972) Vol. IX, pp. 150-164.
8. "On the Work of the CC of the Communist Party of Estonia with Leading Cadres," A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on January 30, 1967; "On the Work of the Vladimir Oblast Party Committee in

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the Selection and Training of Cadres for Trade and Everyday Services," A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on April 8, 1968; and "On the Work of the Volgograd Oblast Party Committee in the Selection, Placement, and Training of Cadres in Industry," A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on September 11, 1968. Published in *KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh Syezdov, Konferentsii i Plenumov TsK* (Moscow, 1972) Vol. IX, pp. 215-221, 416-420, and 468-473.

9. "On the Work of the Omsk Oblast Party Committee," A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on May 11, 1967; "On the Work of the Perm Oblast Party Organizations in Exercising Leadership over the Trade Unions," A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on September 18, 1967; "On the Work of the Krasnoyarsk Kray Party Organizations in Exercising Leadership over the Komsomol," A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on May 8, 1968; and "On the Work of the Dobrinsky Rayon Party Committee in Lipetsk Oblast," A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on September 12, 1968. Published in *KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh Syezdov, Konferentsii i Plenumov TsK* (Moscow, 1972) Vol. IX, pp. 270-279, 374-380, 425-433, and 474-481. See also "On the Work of the Rostov Obkom of the Party in Fulfilling the Decisions of the September (1965) Plenum of the CC CPSU concerning the Introduction of New Methods of Economic Management," A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on October 8, 1968; "On the Work of the Party Committee of the Nevinnomyssky Chemical Combine in Mobilizing the Labor Collective toward Raising the Output of Mineral Fertilizers," A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on February 7, 1969; "On the Work of the Voronezh Obkom of the Party in Fulfilling Decisions of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU concerning the Improvement of Trade and Everyday Services for the Rural Population," A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on August 1, 1969; "On the Experience of the Work of the Party Committee of the Shchekino Chemical Combine with respect to Mobilizing the Labor Collective to Increase Output by Raising Labor Productivity," A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on October 6, 1969; and "On the Work of the Irkutsk Obkom of the CPSU in Raising the Role of Engineering-Technical Workers in Speeding Technical Progress at Oblast Plants and Construction Sites," A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on October 9, 1969. Published in *KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh Syezdov, Konferentsii i Plenumov TsK* (Moscow, 1972) Vol. IX, pp. 495-500, and Vol. X, pp. 13-15, 72-76, and 88-97.

10. Articles 47, 50, and 59 of the 1961 CPSU Statutes.

11. "On the Work of the Party Committee of the USSR Ministry of Meat and Dairy Industry," A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on February 3, 1970 (published in *KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh Syezdov, Konferentsii i Plenumov TsK*; (Moscow, 1972) Vol. X pp. 191-197).

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12. "On Partial Changes in the Statutes of the CPSU," A Resolution of the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adopted Unanimously on April 9, 1971. Published in *XXIV Syezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Stenograficheskii Otchet* (Moscow, 1971) Vol II, pp. 242-243.

13. "On Partial Changes in the Statutes of the CPSU," A Resolution of the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adopted Unanimously on April 9, 1971. Published in *XXIV Syezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Stenograficheskii Otchet* (Moscow, 1971) pp. 242-243.

14. Romanov, when still second secretary of the Leningrad Oblast party organization, had described in glowing terms the creation of "integrated" primary party organizations in Leningrad in early 1970 (*Kommunist* No. 3 February 1970). His interest in the innovation may have been prompted, in part, by the extent to which Leningrad would be a headquarters area.

15. This innovation was described in *Pravda* on October 22, 1970, in an article by F. Shishlov, a locksmith and member of the party committee of the Urals Railroad Car Manufacturing Works at Nizhny Tagil in Sverdlovsk Oblast.

16. A lead article in *Pravda* on May 23, 1975 indicated that the Soviet authorities hoped to double the number of enterprises organized into production associations during 1975. It said that by the end of the year, approximately one fourth of the enterprises would be so amalgamated. According to other publications, 12 percent of all enterprises had been grouped into about 6,000 associations by the end of 1974.

17. Such councils were discussed in *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya* on March 12, 1974, and in *Kommunist Moldavii* No. 12, December 1974.

18. *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, March 12, 1974.

19. *Pravda*, January 10, 1972.

20. *Ibid.*

21. See, for example: "On the Work to Improve Production Efficiency in the Enterprises of Gorky Oblast Motor Vehicle and Chemical Industries in Light of the 24th CPSU Congress Decisions" (*Pravda*, August 20, 1971); "On the Fulfillment of Plans for and Raising the Effectiveness of Capital Construction in the Bashkir ASSR" (*Pravda*, January 23, 1972); "On the Work

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of the Minsk Tractor Plant Party Organization in Increasing the Production and Sociopolitical Activeness of the Labor Collective" (*Pravda*, February 1, 1972); "On the Work of the Altay CPSU Kraykom to Enhance the Role of the Specialists in Developing Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz Production" (*Pravda*, July 27, 1972); "On the Progress of Work on the Automation of Production Processes in Ferrous Metallurgy" (*Pravda*, August 30, 1972); "On the Course of the Fulfillment of the 24th CPSU Congress and Central Committee Plenum Decisions on the Intensification of Agricultural Production in Korovograd Oblast" (*Partinaya Zhizn* No. 19, October 1972); "On the Work of the Party Organization at the "Lenin Kolkhoz in Zernograd Rayon, Rostov Oblast" (*Pravda*, October 6, 1972); "On the Organizational Work of the Belgorod and Kursk Obkoms of the Party in Fulfilling the Decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress on the Creation of a New Ferrous Metallurgy Iron Ore Base at the Deposits of the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly" (*Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, May 31, 1973); and, "On the Organizational Work of the Kharkov Party Obkom in Improving the Utilization of Reserves and Strengthening the Regime of Economy in Industry and in Construction" (*Pravda*, October 12, 1973).

22. *Pravda*, September 18, 1971.

23. "On Measures for Improvement of the Course System for Retraining Leading Party and Soviet Cadres" (*Partinaya Zhizn* No. 18, September 1971).

24. "On the Participation of the Leading and Engineering and Technical Workers of the Cherepovets Metallurgical Plant in the Ideological and Political Education of Members of the Collective," A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee (*Pravda*, December 29, 1971).

25. See, for example: "On the Work of the Party Committee of the 'Order of Lenin No. 36' Construction Trust under the USSR Ministry of Construction 'Glavzapstroi'" (*Pravda*, August 21, 1974); "On the Exercise of Control by the USSR Ministry of Communications' Party Committee over the Work of the Apparatus in Implementing the Directives of the Party and the Government" (*Pravda*, November 22, 1974); "On the Zlatoust City Party Committee's Leadership of the Primary Party Organizations of Enterprises" (*Pravda*, October 15, 1975); "On the Work of the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy of the USSR in Training and Raising the Qualifications of Industrial Workers" (*Pravda*, November 5, 1975); and "On the Work of the Lithuanian Agricultural Research Institute in Raising the Efficiency of Research and in Introducing Scientific-Technical Achievements into Agricultural Production" (*Selskaya Zhizn*, November 14, 1975).

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## V. Information Flow

Despite the overall trend toward a return to the "old ways," there was one area in which the fresh winds Khrushchev had unleashed in the party bureaucracy persisted. Public discussion of "justified" dissent from party policy was quashed and the claims of political science to "scientific expertise" were quelled, but the problem of information flow within the party—up, down, and laterally—received continuing attention, often with a fillip of "sociological research." An "informed electorate" might be too much, but an "informed party officialdom" just might be desirable.

A separate Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee was created in late 1965. The department was first identified as such in August 1966, but its chief had been cited in the Soviet press as head of an unidentified department in October 1965. The department reverted to its former status as a sector in late 1967 or early 1968—the victim of a reduction in force that was at least in part impelled by partisan politics.

Most of the reports about the activities of the "information" department described it as collecting information, preparing studies, and forwarding proposals on foreign policy questions to the top men in the Kremlin. A few, however, added that it was conducting opinion polls in local party organizations, studying the effectiveness of various forms of party work, and coordinating the efforts of scientific groups and others whose activities would be of special interest to the central party bureaucracy. The backgrounds of the men appointed to the top jobs in the "information" department suggest that it was mainly concerned with world events. The activities of these people while holding these jobs suggest that one of their prime responsibilities may have been to brief party officials on foreign policy issues and to keep tabs on how developments in that area were being presented to the rank-and-file party members.

It was also in late 1965 that the authorities in Moscow made a number of moves to sharpen the distinction between the material to be passed on to the party membership and that meant for the nonparty population. The use of CPSU Central Committee letters to inform party members about sensitive issues was revived, and there also may have been an increase in the frequency with which officials of the CPSU Central Committee were dispatched as circuit riders carrying the word on other questions to the local party organizations. The use of CPSU Central Committee letters to inform party members of certain significant matters had dropped off during the late 1950s and early 1960s. The practice of using CPSU Central Committee officials to brief local party organizations is more difficult to get an accurate count on, but also seems to have increased in the post-Khrushchev period.

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Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership put an end to the practice of publishing stenographic reports of the proceedings at the Central Committee plenums, and there is reason to believe that the number of unpublished CPSU Central Committee resolutions began to increase at that time.

The practice of publishing stenographic reports of the proceedings at CPSU Central Committee plenums had begun in December 1958, and it had been followed for all subsequent plenums featuring a discussion of substantive issues, until the September 1965 plenum. The question of the unpublished CPSU Central Committee resolutions is more difficult to document, but a number have come to light since late 1965—more than during the late 1950s and early 1960s.

### Propaganda and Agitation

Shortly after the 23rd Congress, the CPSU Central Committee "Propaganda and Agitation" department lost the "Agitation" element in its title. This change in title occurred only at the national level, however. The departments at the republic, kray, oblast, city, and rayon levels retained the more inclusive heading. The meaning of the change in mid-May 1966 has never been completely clear, but it almost certainly was connected with the effort to sharpen the distinction between propaganda—the presentation of "many ideas to a few persons"—and agitation—the propounding of "one or a few ideas...to a mass of people."<sup>1</sup> Propaganda—reasoned arguments meant to influence the party membership and other "politically literate" individuals—had to remain under the direct control of the authorities in Moscow. Contradictions in its complex and often abstract explanations of official policy would only confuse the select audience for those "messages." Agitation programs—relying heavily on exhortations or appeals to the emotions of the local audience—required as much decentralization as possible. Anything less would reduce the flexibility of programs primarily concerned with face-to-face communication on single and simple issues of local significance.

The Soviet leadership was anxious to revitalize the propaganda effort, which could hardly be distinguished from the agitation programs during the last years under Khrushchev. A 1956 reform had reorganized the study programs at the evening universities of Marxism-Leninism, the local agency for training party propagandists. It had made it much easier for nonparty students to enroll at those institutions, which had been reserved mainly for party members in the past. "Practical work"—checking up on problems at a local plant, discovering methods of raising labor productivity, etc.—had become increasingly important, and theoretical studies had been more and more ignored as the number of nonparty students had increased to 73 percent of the total enrollment at the time when Khrushchev was removed from office. Less and less attention was devoted to the task of indoctrinating the party membership as the emphasis shifted to merely instructing functionaries in the specific managerial or secretarial skills required by their jobs.

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To do so, it took steps to stabilize the composition of the corps of propagandists carrying the "word" to the party membership. Although the propagandists remained unpaid volunteers and this function continued to be but one of several party assignments for many of them, they were given better training. They were to become experts in a particular field—people with a specific function in the propaganda effort, rather than generalists dealing with any and all subjects after a hurried briefing. Propagandists were to be better prepared than they had been in the past to handle questions from their audiences.

If the effort to improve the propaganda effort required a great deal of control by the authorities in Moscow, the agitation programs needed more and more flexibility at the time when their base of operations was being transferred from the place of work to the city block or individual apartment buildings. This shift was dictated by the introduction of the five-day work week and by the shortening of the midday break for lunch at the work site. These reforms had reduced the amount of free time that workers had for agitation programs at their place of work and had increased their free time away from the factory. Conducting agitation programs at the residential units would interfere less with production work at the factory, and it would provide a means of filling at least part of that additional free time away from the factory with "socially useful" activities. It would also provide a means of reaching the people who had retired, but continued to be interested in civic affairs.

#### **Politinformators**

Meanwhile, an effort was under way to replace traditional "agitators" with more sophisticated specialists in political information, who would be more capable of molding public opinion in a largely industrialized society.<sup>2</sup> The "agitators" had been drawn, for the most part, from the "more advanced" workers and peasants; the majority of the "politinformators" were to be party or government officials, economic managers, scientists, agronomists, or other specialists. "Agitators" were to give talks on various subjects; "politinformators" were to specialize in international affairs, domestic policy, economics, or cultural matters.

Another major difference between "agitators" and "politinformators" was the manner in which they were organized and deployed. "Agitators" were organized in collectives operating at the lowest echelon of the party bureaucracy—primary party organizations or, where necessary, party groups—and usually conducted their talks at the office or shop where they worked. "Politinformators" were to operate in separate groups under direct guidance from the party committees of the larger primary party organizations, or of the rayon party organizations. They were to move from

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department to department at an enterprise, and from enterprise to enterprise, or from one residential unit to another within a given rayon.

A conference of ideological officials in October 1966 provided evidence of a disagreement over the extent to which the "agitators" should give way to the "politinformators."<sup>3</sup> The controversy continued after the "politinformator" groups had begun to appear on the scene in early 1967. The performance of the "politinformators" was receiving a generally positive assessment by late 1967, but warnings against underestimating the importance of the "agitators" also began to appear at that time.<sup>4</sup> Favorable accounts of the work done by the "agitators" were more frequent in late 1968, and critical remarks about the "politinformators" began to appear in early 1969.<sup>5</sup> The retreat from the campaign to abolish the "agitators" reached its culmination in mid-1969, when a discussion of the question invoked Lenin's blessing to signal their complete rehabilitation as the co-equals of the "politinformators" in the domestic system of political communications.<sup>6</sup>

The significance of this imbroglio stems in part from the fact that the long-cherished belief in the "agitator" as the political guide for his collective had been dispelled by surveys conducted by the party during the mid-1960s.<sup>7</sup> It was one of the few cases in which the findings of such social research coincided with a policy initiative, and it is all the more remarkable for its having involved an area that has always been one of the party's exclusive preserves. Unable to allow "outsiders" to participate in the discussion and faced with conflicting opinions within the party, the Soviet leadership had but one choice: to resolve the issue in favor of either the pro-"agitator" or the pro-"politinformator" group, or settle upon a compromise to preserve intraparty peace. Khrushchev probably would have chosen the first option; the selection of the second by his successors exemplifies their cautious approach toward innovations and reforms in any policy area.

Although none of the top leaders ever went on record on this issue, it almost certainly was the subject of Kremlin politicking. The drive to replace the "agitators" with "politinformators" was led by V. I. Stepakov (Chief of the CPSU Central Committee's "Propaganda and Agitation," later merely "Propaganda" department from May 1965 until April 1970). It is unlikely that Stepakov would have been as outspoken on the issue without support from higher up, and it is also noteworthy that a number of reports have credited former Politburo member Shelepin with the effort to upgrade the quality of the people working for the CPSU Central Committee or elsewhere in the party bureaucracy.

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### Party Informators

There may have been some connection between the campaign to replace the "agitators" with "politinformators" and the effort to organize—outside the usual command-and-response channels—a system for internal dissemination of party news "downward" and for the collection, processing, and analysis of party information "upward." The latter, "upward" segment of the system was particularly sensitive. The central party authorities wished to gain a broad, objective, first-hand view of attitudes and activities within the party, but the regional party leaders were accustomed to exercising some degree of control over such information to protect their own interests. This may explain why, although the CPSU Central Committee's "Organizational-Party Work" department had acquired a "party information" sector by April 1967,<sup>8</sup> it was not until mid-1969 that the authorities in Moscow convened a series of high-level party meetings throughout the country to discuss a "further improvement of party-political information."<sup>9</sup>

In any event, the seminar-conferences marked the introduction of "party informators" on a nationwide basis—professional party staffers at the republic, kray, oblast, and city levels, and in the larger rayons; and unpaid volunteers in the smaller rayons and in the primary party organizations. There was no clear-cut division between the party workers disseminating information "downward" and those collecting the intelligence needed by the higher authorities. The "politinformators" and other propaganda workers provided much information on the "moods" of the population—from observation of the "moods" of their audiences, from the reams of written questions submitted to lecturers, and so forth. The processing and analysis of all "upward" information fell to the "Inquiry and Information Service" of the party apparatus. In sum, both the "Propaganda" and the "Organizational-Party Work" departments were involved in a single "party-political information" system, with the latter department having jurisdiction over all "upward" information, after it had reached the top.

Meanwhile, various elements within the party had been given a taste of the benefits to be derived from a more sophisticated analysis of the information available and had begun to levy information requirements of their own. Although warnings against considering "concrete sociological research" as a panacea and as the one single criterion of the truth appeared in the central press from time to time, the use of questionnaires and other such instruments to compile information on the state of affairs within the party was on the rise in the late 1960s.

### Glasnost and Information

In June 1974, Brezhnev pushed the "information" theme forward a step when he said that the extension of *glasnost*—openness—in the work of

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the party, soviet, and economic organs was especially urgent.<sup>10</sup> The term *glasnost* has a checkered past, developing "liberal" connotations during the mid-sixties, when agitation for *glasnost* was associated with the efforts of younger, technically trained party members to influence Soviet policy. These "young Turks" had met opposition from older members who maintained that the primary responsibility of a communist was political, not technical supervision, and the term fell into disuse after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev's use of the term shortly after a "responsible" official of the CPSU Central Committee had come out with a ringing endorsement of the need for freedom of discussion within the party<sup>11</sup> suggested that the General Secretary felt that a greater flow of information was necessary if the increasingly complex society was to operate efficiently.

Two months later, a Central Committee resolution instructed regional party organizations to improve their work in the selection and education of party functionaries, propagandists, journalists, lecturers, teachers, and figures working in scientific and cultural fields.<sup>12</sup> It called for ideological workers to be well grounded in pedagogy and psychology, propaganda skills, and in how to organize "educational" programs—as well as in topical questions on developments at home or abroad. Regional party units were also instructed to make use of all methods of "educational" work. The programs were to be conducted at job sites, at cultural and recreation centers, and within residential districts or individual apartment buildings, and to employ both collective and individual methods of influencing public opinion. Special emphasis, however, was to be placed on the use of the mass media, especially television, in selling the "Soviet way of life."

The resolution noted with approval the practice by some regional party committees of holding "regular press conferences" and "editors' days" and issuing "information bulletins" on their organizational and political work. It also approved research studies on public opinion and on ways to make ideological work more effective. The Belorussian party organization received high marks in the August 1974 CPSU Central Committee decree. The resolution implied that the Belorussian organization had gone further than other regional commands in collecting grass-roots party opinion, processing and forwarding it upward through the hierarchy, and then publicizing the party's decisions. Despite the limited extent and the controlled character of this activity, the emphasis on the flow of information both ways within the party apparatus was notable, as was the effort to keep the entire population better informed on party affairs.

No less significant, however, was the emphasis in the resolution on the role of the party committee's ideological sections and on staffing them with people who have shown themselves to be capable propagandists and good

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organizers of "educational" work. This not only enhanced the authority of such party functionaries in controlling the mass media and the educational and cultural institutions, but also strengthened their position within the party bureaucracy itself. It endorsed their existence as a separate, and presumably equal, career service within the party bureaucracy.

## FOOTNOTES

1. This distinction between propaganda and agitation was initially made by Old Bolshevik Georgi Plekhanov. It was accepted by Lenin as early as 1902 and has been retained since then.

2. By the mid-1960s, the Soviet audience was characterized by almost universal literacy, by growing diversity in terms of knowledge and expertise, and by much greater access to the mass media than previous generations had enjoyed.

3. See, for example, the accounts of the conference in *Agitator* No. 21, November 1966, and in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 21, November 1966.

4. *Pravda* December 25, 1967.

5. Favorable accounts of the work of the "agitators" appeared in *Agitator* No. 11, June 1968; No. 13, July 1968; No. 18, September 1968, and No. 24, December 1968; and *Pravda* on September 6, 1968. Criticism of the work of the "politinformators" appeared in *Agitator* No. 2, January 1969; No. 5, March 1969; and No. 7, April 1969; in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 1, January 1969; and in *Pravda* on January 30, February 24, and March 5, 1969.

6. *Agitator* No. 14, July 1969, pp. 3-6

7. See, for example, A. G. Yefimov and P. V. Pozdnyakov, *Nauchniye Osnovy Partiinoi Propagandy* (Moscow, 1966), pp. 99-100. The results of other surveys in this field appeared in *Zhurnalist* No. 8, August 1967; No. 12, December 1967; No. 2, February 1968; No. 7, July 1968; No. 8, August 1968; and No. 10, October 1969.

8. The first public reference to this sector came when A. Belyakov, its chief, and I. Shvets, his deputy, published an article on party information in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 8, April 1967, pp. 27-34.

9. For reports on these meetings see *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 12, June 1969, pp. 66-67; No. 13, July 1969, pp. 74-75; No. 16, August 1969, pp. 36-37; and No. 17, September 1969, pp. 64-65. Also see *Pravda Vostoka* for June 14, 1969, and *Kazakhstan Pravda* for August 23, 1969.

10. Brezhnev made his remarks about the need for *glasnost* during his speech on the eve of the national elections (*Pravda*, June 15, 1974). As far as is known, neither he nor any other current Soviet leader had previously used



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the word in this manner, and none of the top men in the Kremlin have used it in public since then. Their discussion of the relative merits of technical versus ideological training for cadres during that same election campaign may, however, have been another facet of the *glasnost* controversy.

11. F. F. Petrenko, "Freedom of Discussion and Criticism—A Fundamental Principle of the Life and Activity of the CPSU," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4, April 1974.


12. "On the Work of the Belorussian Party Organization in Selecting and Educating Ideological Cadres," A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee (*Pravda*, August 31, 1974).

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## VI. Internal Party Democracy

The whole problem of internal party democracy, with its code words of "collectivity," "criticism and self-criticism," and "one-man leadership" is, of course, heavily layered with implications for the situation in the Kremlin as well as, on occasion, policy squabbles. The February 1975 Central Committee decree on the work of the Tambov Obkom, for example, clearly had echoes for the position of General Secretary Brezhnev. Because Tambov had established a considerable name for itself with an unusual experiment in the management of agriculture, it also had implications for that debate. The Obkom 1st Secretary, V. I. Cherny, had probable earlier career ties with Polyansky—still another echo.



These layers, however entrancing, are beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, Central Committee decrees on the subject do have an additional valid existence as a record of the general instructions issued to all party officials, regardless of their individual awareness of hidden significance. It is in this context that the following section should be read.

### Collectivity the Watchword

Following Khrushchev's ouster for, inter alia, making decisions without consulting his colleagues, periodic discussions of the principles governing the work of party organs stressed the subordination of individual leaders to the leadership group.<sup>2</sup> Party officials were reminded of the need for a frank discussion of the items on the agenda for a party meeting, not just a report from the leader in charge of the area in question. Party officials were taken to task for ignoring criticism of their mistakes, and for taking action against party members who dared voice such criticism.

A CPSU Central Committee decree adopted in November 1969 criticized "large-scale deficiencies" in the meetings held by the Yaroslavl city party organizations.<sup>3</sup> The resolution complained that meetings were not being held on the schedule required by the party statutes, that attendance was unsatisfactory because the meetings were held at inconvenient times,

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and that the meetings discussed trivial matters while ignoring the more important questions. It also noted that the discussions were frequently simplistic and failed to take into account the political maturity of the members of the party organization. Subsequent discussion of the resolution in *Pravda* and in *Partinaya Zhizn*, as well as in the republic press, made it clear that party organizations throughout the country were to draw the proper conclusions and put their own houses in order.

The resolution also complained that rank-and-file party members were not being brought into the decision-making, and that nonparty officials and industrial workers were being excluded from deliberations. Meetings did not produce a broad exchange of opinions; instead discussion was monopolized by a narrow circle of speakers. "Certain" leaders were said to regard the meetings as forums for criticizing subordinates, and for blaming failures on the party organization as a whole. They were also said to ignore the opinions of the other party members and to react poorly to any criticism of their own work. As a result, resolutions passed at the party meetings were abstract and declarative in nature and offered no concrete suggestions about how to correct shortcomings in the work of the party organization.

To correct the situation, the resolution called for further development of party democracy and collectivity. It told party organizations to hold more frequent and more extensive meetings; to have more rank-and-file members take part in the preparations for those meetings; and to inform all party members about the agenda further in advance and in more detail. Meetings were to devote more attention to the most urgent economic and political problems, and the discussions were to be marked by "criticism and self-criticism." Factory managers and other administrators were to heed such criticism, not dismiss it as from party leaders ignorant of the technical problems involved. Party officials were to pay more attention to suggestions and comments from rank-and-file party members, instead of conniving with other local officials anxious to avoid being held responsible for shortcomings.

### **The Proletariat in the Scientific-Technical Revolution**

The period immediately after the adoption of the "Yaroslavl" resolution was marked by several signs of a revival within the party by responsible officials of the kind of political reformism that had flourished under Krushchev. The press carried a flurry of articles on Stalin's victims,<sup>4</sup> and Stalin received a "balanced" treatment that called attention to shortcomings that had been taboo topics since 1966.<sup>5</sup> The "Theses" for the Centennial of Lenin's Birth, published in December 1969 contained an astonishing "error"—attributing to Lenin views that had been set forth by Otto Bauer and had been ridiculed by Lenin.<sup>6</sup> The "mistake" implicitly

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raised questions about the shift from Khrushchev's "party of the whole people" to the "fortress vanguard" concept (see Part I) and about the allegedly dominant role of the working class under modern production conditions and had overtones for the troubled question of specialization for party officials. Although this error was quickly corrected,<sup>7</sup> the scandal indicated that revisionism and reformism persisted among relatively high ranking party officials.<sup>8</sup>

Less than a week after the "correction" of the "error," a *Pravda* editorial on the use of the "theses" in party ideological work warned that unresolved questions (unspecified) must not be presented to just any audience in the USSR. The tone of the editorial suggested that either this very thing had been happening, or some questions which previously had been thought to be resolved were again being debated.<sup>9</sup>

#### What Kind of Party Officials?

Early 1970 also brought a renewed discussion of the criteria for selecting people for sensitive posts, and of how leaders should make decisions. An official of the CPSU Central Committee's "Organizational-Party work" department asserted that the USSR needed "team players" who understand the party line and are loyal to it. He also put a positive light on the post-Khrushchev leadership's failure to weed out those who had fallen behind developments in their fields, noting that the party rightfully gives attentive regard to those who have been working for the cause for many years, and blasting "opportunists of all kinds, especially Trotskyists" who "shamelessly flatter youth and hound them on against the old, experienced cadres." He insisted that collectivity "rules out" irresponsibility on the part of leaders; pointed up the importance of a leader's having enough courage to act on his own without passing the buck to the collective; and told leaders to maintain close contact with the masses, implying that a leader with his ear close to the ground would be better attuned to the nation's needs than one who merely listened to what the establishment's specialists had to say.<sup>10</sup>

A deputy chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee took a different position on several of these questions.<sup>11</sup> He emphasized that leaders had to keep up with the changing times and hinted that those who could or would not should be retired or moved to less demanding work. He affirmed that "subjectivism" was a danger that still had to be fought, that collectivity was no guarantee against mistakes or irresponsibility on the part of one or another leader. He also put a great deal of emphasis on the importance of a leader's consulting with his colleagues and with his subordinates who might well be better informed on the question at issue.

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There was more emphasis on the need for a strong leader, however, in most of the articles published on the subject after the announcement that the 24th Congress would not be held until March 1971.<sup>12</sup> Although pro-collectivity arguments also appeared from time to time, they were not as outspoken as earlier ones had been about the dangers of one-man rule.<sup>13</sup> The proponents of a strong leader insisted that one-man decisions are not incompatible with democracy and that final decisions belong to one leader—"to one comrade, known for his firmness, decisiveness, boldness, ability to conduct practical work, and enjoying the most confidence."<sup>14</sup>

### Party Discipline vs. Collectivity

The initial period after the 24th Congress saw a great deal of emphasis on the need to strengthen party discipline and relatively little on the importance of developing party democracy further. The emphasis on discipline reflected a determination to prevent detente from leading to undesired results at home or in relations with fraternal communist parties. Another factor, of course, was the preoccupation with preparations for and implementation of the party card exchange. Since mid-1974 a number of discussions of leadership principles have stressed the importance of reaching decisions on vital matters "not individually nor by narrow groups of leaders, but by democratic party forums" such as congresses, conferences, and general party meetings and have insisted that "all communists are guaranteed the right to discuss freely questions of policy and the party's practical activity."<sup>15</sup>

Party secretaries have been reminded that a discussion will be more fruitful if a comprehensive prospectus of the report to be delivered at a meeting, and a draft of the resolution to be adopted on it, are circulated in advance for the appropriate party members to familiarize themselves with.<sup>16</sup> They have been warned that "we must not permit a belittling of the role of the collective organs of party leadership, the bureau and the committee; we cannot tolerate it when the solution of all questions is confined to one leader."<sup>17</sup> This is because collective leadership not only offers the best possibility for working out and implementing a "scientific" policy, but also provides safeguards against "one-sidedness" and "subjectivist" decisions.<sup>18</sup> To do so, however, there must be continuous improvement in the qualitative composition of the leadership group through the addition of new, fresh forces to its membership.<sup>19</sup>

Discussions of internal party matters have recognized that "unilateral order-giving authority" is in line with Lenin's teachings,<sup>20</sup> and that Lenin deemed talented and experienced "chiefs" essential.<sup>21</sup> They also have made the point that violations of party and state discipline must be dealt with by

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expulsion from the party, when necessary.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, the emphasis has been on the importance of promoting collectivity at all levels of the party hierarchy.<sup>23</sup> Regional party commands have been told to make better use of criticism and self-criticism when reviewing their own work—not just when going over the performance of subordinate party units or other institutions.<sup>24</sup> The CPSU Central Committee resolution on the matter says that every party committee must ensure that all party members actively participate in the discussion, elaboration, and implementation of party decisions. To do so, they must improve their efforts at informing rank-and-file members about the work of the party committee and must take firm disciplinary action—including dismissal—against any officials who attempt to suppress justified criticism or persecute their critics. Subsequent discussions of the resolution made it clear that this referred to party officials, not just government executives and other administrators and managers working outside the party bureaucracy.<sup>25</sup>

The CPSU Central Committee plenum in April 1975 announced that the 25th Congress would open on February 24, 1976, but provided no guidelines on how local party organizations were to prepare for the congress.<sup>26</sup> A month later, however, a *Pravda* editorial noted the importance of having a majority of the members of the local party committee take part in the preparations for plenums, and presumably in the preparations for conferences and other such meetings as well at that echelon.<sup>27</sup> The editorial endorsed the advance distribution of resumes of reports and told party officials to take comments of committee members into consideration in the final draft.

The editorial recalled that the CPSU Central Committee resolution on the use of criticism and self-criticism by the party organizations in Tambov Oblast had faulted meetings that fail to discuss major shortcomings of institutions or individuals. It added that the errors leading to the recent ouster of the party first secretary in Sumy Oblast (in the Ukraine) had been made possible by failure to make proper use of criticism there. It pointed out that only a few of the more than 2,500 people who had spoken at the 318 plenums held by the city and district party organizations in Sumy Oblast in recent years had made substantial complaints about the work of their party committees, bureaus, or secretaries.

Nevertheless, most party meetings on the local scene continue to be long on sound and panoply and short on a frank airing of problems and mistakes—as are the plenums and other meetings at the national level. This is clear from accounts of the various meetings that have been held in preparation for the 25th Congress.

FOOTNOTES

2. See the articles by F. F. Petrenko in *Pravda* on July 20, 1966; in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 3, March 1967; and in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 17, September 1967; the articles by P. A. Rodionov in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 10, October 1966; and in *Kommunist* No. 18, December 1967; and the articles by G. I. Popov in *Pravda* on July 21, 1967; and in *Kommunist* No. 13, September 1968. Also see the article by P. M. Masherov in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 18, September 1967; the articles by L. A. Slepov in *Kommunist* No. 4, March 1968; and in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 9, September 1968; the article by G. D. Obichkin in *Politicheskoye Samoobrazovaniye* No. 1, January 1969; and the article by V. Zasorin in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 3, February 1969.

Not every discussion of the virtues of collective leadership took this tack, however. An article by D. A. Kunayev (first secretary of the Kazakhstan republic party organization) in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 19, October 1966, stressed the primacy of individual leadership. An essay by K. F. Katushev (then, first secretary of the Gorky Oblast party organization, and subsequently elevated to the CPSU Secretariat) in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* on September 18, 1967, recognized the need for freedom of discussion until a decision had been made, but also emphasized that the group could not wait until the last holdout had been convinced of the correctness of this or that decision. Like Kunayev, Katushev insisted that a leader could not let the discussion get bogged down, and that each member of the group had to carry out his part in executing the decision arrived at by the majority.

3. "On the Practice of Conducting Party Meetings in the Yaroslavl City Party Organization," A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on November 3, 1969. Published in *KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh Syezdov, Konferentsii, i Plenumov TsK* (Moscow, 1972) Vol. X, pp. 101-106.

4. *Pravda*, November 17, 1969; *Izvestia*, November 18, 1969; *Krasnaya Zvezda*, November 19, 1969.

5. The references to Stalin in the new history of the CPSU (authorized for publication on November 26, 1969) were milder than those in the 1962 edition, but reportedly still left the neo-Stalinists in the USSR unhappy with its treatment of the late dictator. A month later, they succeeded in having yet another version of the party's history authorized—one that further dampened the criticism of Stalin. Meanwhile, a *Pravda* commentary

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on December 21, marking Stalin's 90th birthday, while noting that it was while Stalin was General Secretary that the USSR's socioeconomic transformation took place and victory over opposition elements within the party and over Germany was achieved, also charged Stalin with theoretical and political errors "which became chronic in the last period of his life." This article reportedly created an even greater uproar because the Soviet conservatives had been led to believe that after the party history scandal there would be a generally favorable article about Stalin to celebrate his 90th birthday. The article was to be highlighted by a picture of Stalin in the full dress uniform of a Generalissimo; when the article appeared (minus picture), it caused many telephones to ring on the morning of the 21st with marshals and other prominent figures burning the ears of their friends on the Central Committee. Another compromise followed; in dealing with the Stalin problem, the Lenin "Theses" referred only to the CPSU condemnation of the personality cult which led to "the misuse of power and violation of socialist democracy and revolutionary legality."

6. The "Theses," drafted by the CPSU Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism and published in the central press on December 23, listed the "five points" of Otto Bauer, a leader of the Austrian Social Democratic Party and a prominent theoretician of the Second International, attributing them to Lenin. As a matter of fact, Lenin had polemicized against Bauer's "five points" precisely because they implicitly criticized the manner in which the Bolshevik Revolution had been carried out.

7. A "corrected" text of the "Theses" was published in *Kommunist* No. 1, January 1970 (approved for publication on December 30, 1969). *Pravda's* version of December 23: "In his notes on the international situation and the main tasks of the Comintern, Lenin pointed to five social factors of the working class' strength: first, its number; second, its organization or self-discipline; third, its place in the process of production and distribution; fourth, its activity; fifth, its upbringing or education. Since the time Lenin expressed this idea, the numbers of the working class have increased sharply, its organization and political activity have risen immeasurably, as well as its general education and vocational training." *Kommunist* deleted all the underlined passage, and substituted "In our time" to open the remaining sentence of the paragraph.

8. Curiously, it was the chief of the CPSU CC Propaganda Department, who appears to have taken the fall for the "Theses" mistake, not the Director of the CC CPSU Institute of Marxism-Leninism.

9. *Pravda* January 6, 1970.

10. M. Nazarov, *Kommunist* No. 1, January 1970.

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11. V. Zaluzhny, *Izvestia*, January 8, 1970.

12. The announcement came in the resolution adopted at the CPSU Central Committee plenum held on July 13, 1970 (*Pravda*, July 14, 1970).

13. See, for example, the piece in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 2, February 1971, by S. Smirnov. Although urging a "further development of intra-party democracy" and a "strengthening of the principle of collective leadership," it fell far short of the challenges to the idea of one-man rule in the articles by I. I. Ivanov in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 6, June 1969, by P. A. Rodionov in *Pravda* on August 2, 1969, by V. P. Nikolayeva in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 9, September 1969, and by Rodionov in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4, April 1970.

14. This argument was made in the article by A. Pershin in *Kommunist* No. 1, January 1971. Pershin also quoted Lenin on the need for "unquestioned obedience to the will of one person, a Soviet leader, during work."

15. F. Petrenko, *Pravda*, June 9, 1974.

16. Ukrainian republic first secretary V. V. Shcherbitsky, a full member of the CPSU Politburo, made a point of the work done in this area by the Ukrainian leadership in an article in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 2, January 1975.

17. *Ibid.*

18. This explanation was offered by P. A. Rodionov (First deputy director of the CPSU Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism) in *Pravda* on January 21, 1975. His remarks, made at a time when Brezhnev's position in the Soviet leadership had become the subject of uncertainty inside the USSR as well as abroad, may have been meant to remind the faithful that the fate of the nation does not depend on one man, that rule by committee goes on regardless of the state of Brezhnev's health. It is also possible that they were designed to reiterate the rules of the game for whoever was to move into Brezhnev's post, if such a change was to take place in the near future.

19. *Ibid.* Here, Rodionov appeared to be saying that it was time to get on with the overdue rejuvenation of the party hierarchy at the Central Committee-Central Auditing Commission echelon, and he may also have had in mind similar changes at the Politburo-Secretariat level.

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20. Rodionov, *Pravda*, January 21, 1975.
21. A. Vodolazsky, *Kommunist* No. 11, July 1975.
22. *Ibid.*
23. Rodionov, *Pravda*, January 21, 1975.
24. "On the State of Criticism and Self-Criticism in the Tambov Oblast Party Organization," A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee (*Pravda*, February 28, 1975).
25. See, for example, the editorial in *Pravda* on March 4, 1975.
26. "On the Convocation of the Regular XXV Congress of the CPSU," A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on April 16, 1975. (*Pravda*, April 17, 1975). The decision setting the date for the party congress came earlier and more smoothly than it had for the previous congresses during the post-Khrushchev period. Unlike the announcements concerning the 23rd and 24th congresses, made in September 1965 and July 1970 respectively, however, the April 1975 announcement said nothing about the agenda—the reports and the people expected to deliver them—or the formula to be followed by the local party organizations in electing their delegates to the congress. Although this information may have been circulated through private channels soon after the April 1975 plenum, it was not announced publicly until a subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenum was held on December 1, 1975.
27. *Pravda*, May 27, 1975.

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## VII. Total Size and Composition of the Apparatus

The Soviet leaders have taken pains to hide the rise in the number of professional (paid) functionaries working for the apparatus. Their attitude was expressed by Brezhnev at the 24th Congress in 1971, when he noted that there had been a 20-percent reduction in the professional staff "during the past 14 years."<sup>1</sup> His statement glossed over the fact that his "14 years" included the Khrushchev period in which there had been a reduction in force of 30-40 percent, and that the apparatus has grown larger since then.

The creation of new oblast, city, and rayon party organizations, and the resurrection of the rural rayon units have contributed to the increase in the size of the apparatus. Another factor has been the expansion of the full-time staffs of the regional commands. The party information sections at rayon, city, okrug, oblast, kray, and republic levels appear to be headed, in most cases, by full-time party workers supervising the army of volunteer "party informators" working at the primary and shop organizations. Also, the okrug, city, and rayon party committees have set up "General" sections. These two innovations alone have probably added six to ten thousand full-time functionaries to the payroll, and there may have been additional moves to expand the staffs of the local party units.

Even more important, perhaps, has been the increase in full-time party secretaries at the individual production sites. The number of such officials at collective farms and state farms increased by 5,800 between January 1965 and January 1975.<sup>2</sup> The increase in the number of large primary organizations at other places of employment probably has brought an equally large increase in full-time party jobs. The number of primary organizations with over 100 members has risen by more than 5,000 since January 1965, and most of these units probably are at sites other than collective or state farms. It also seems reasonable to assume that most of the "exceptions" granted to the rule barring full-time party workers at units with less than 150 members are granted to party organizations at coal mines, oil fields, and other industrial "outposts" of this nature.

On the other hand, the Soviet leaders have pointed proudly to a further enlargement of the elective "aktiv"—the group of party members who voluntarily participate in public affairs and are rewarded by being elected to the committee of their local party organization. The increase in this "aktiv" at the union republic, kray, oblast, okrug, city, and rayon levels has been slower, however, than it had been during the last years under Khrushchev. The same is also true of the increase in the number of people included in the elective "aktiv" at primary and shop party organizations, and party groups. (Table I)

The increase in the elective "aktiv" has been accompanied by changes in its composition. Not surprisingly, Soviet discussions of these changes have focused on the increase in the percentage of workers and peasants, although this has been primarily at the lower echelons—okrug, city, and rayon. At the same time, the number of enterprise directors, party officials, and soviet (local government) leaders in the "aktiv" has also increased. (Table II)

#### Quality—Higher Education

The post-Khrushchev leadership also has made much of the degree to which its policies have contributed to an improvement in the quality of the party staff—still "the most important channel and means to carry out the policy of the party."<sup>3</sup> It has pointed out that the percentage of secretaries with a college education has gone up at all echelons of the party bureaucracy, while the percentage of those with little formal education has become negligible at all levels above the primary units. The increase in the percentage of party officials with a college education has been slower, however, than it had been under Khrushchev, and the drop in the percentage of party secretaries with little formal education has also been slower at all echelons than it had been under Khrushchev. (Table III)

The post-Khrushchev period has brought some significant changes in the make-up of the party bureaucracy, however. The following statements about the changes in the make-up of the party bureaucracy are made with an eye to the available information, reflected in Tables IV-VII, but also reflect educated guesses about the additional information hidden among the "unknowns." It is these educated guesses, not uncertainty as to the accuracy of the information provided in Tables IV-VII, that accounts for the use of words such as probably, almost certainly, etc., in the following section of this paper.

One of the most noteworthy changes is the drop in the percentage of the top officials who have received part, if not all, of their "higher education" at a party school, rather than any of the other institutions of advanced learning. Such people now probably make up only a little more than 20 percent of the group as a whole—the Central Committee officials, and the regional leaders in the RSFSR and in the minority republics—and they have dropped from first to third place among that sample. They still include more than 25 percent of the top figures in the minority republics, however, and remain a contender for first place among that segment of the party bureaucracy. (Table IV)

The percentage of graduates from engineering schools, industrial academies, and other such institutions has increased somewhat among the group

as a whole, as well as among the RSFSR leaders. It probably also has increased among Central Committee officials, and is almost certain to have gone up quite a bit among minority republic leaders. People with such education now probably make up over 30 percent of the group as a whole, and almost certainly occupy first place among that sample. They include at least one third of the RSFSR leaders, more than any other sub-group among that segment of the bureaucracy. They may include 30 percent of the Central Committee officials, but probably have slipped to second place among that part of the sample. They probably include over 25 percent of the minority republic leaders, but may rank no better than third among those officials.

The number of graduates from agricultural schools also has increased—possibly to 28 percent—among the group as a whole. Although the number of such people has dropped among Central Committee officials and RSFSR leaders, this probably has been more than offset by the increase among the minority republic leaders. In any event, people with such education certainly remain in second place among the group as a whole—as well as among the RSFSR leaders, with approximately 30 percent of that part of the sample. They probably also make up approximately 30 percent of the minority republic leaders, and may have moved into first place among that group of officials.

Also noteworthy is the increase in graduates from teachers colleges among Central Committee officials. People with such education now probably make up the largest sub-group—at least 30 percent—among that segment of the bureaucracy. The percentage of such people among the RSFSR leaders also has gone up a bit, but probably has remained at the 1964 level among the minority republic leaders, and they continue to be only a small minority among the regional leaders. Meanwhile, there probably has been little change in the percentage of university graduates among the party officials at this level. There has been a drop in the percentage of graduates from the military academies, but it probably is of little consequence.

More important is the drop in the percentage of the party officials with less than a complete college education—especially among the RSFSR leaders. When viewed in connection with the drop in the percentage of people who received their higher education at a party school, it suggests that the present incumbents are at least somewhat better educated than the group holding office in October 1964 was at that time. The most important changes, however, are those that have contributed to an improvement in the programs offered at the various institutions of higher learning. Changes in curricula and improvements in instructional materials almost certainly have made it possible for the more recent graduates to receive a better education than the earlier graduates from the same institution were able to obtain.

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### Professional Party Workers vs. Technocrats

Another significant change during the post-Khrushchev period is the shift in the balance between professional party workers and technocrats among the top party officials. Professional politicians are those who went into politics when they were in their early 30s or younger and have spent most of their career in the party bureaucracy or in other highly politicized jobs. The technocrats are those who were engineers, factory directors, collective farm chairmen, etc., for a number of years before embarking upon a political career when they were in their middle 30s or older. Not surprisingly, none of the party officials are specialists who have spent their entire careers in one particular line of work (outside the party bureaucracy).

The number of professional party workers seems to have increased among the group as a whole and now may represent somewhere in the neighborhood of 75 percent of that sample. It certainly has gone up among the RSFSR leaders, and now probably represents more than 80 percent of that part of the sample. It also has certainly risen among the minority republic leaders, and now probably represents more than 75 percent of those incumbents. On the other hand, the technocrats have increased their number among the Central Committee officials, and now probably hold at least 40 percent of those posts. (Table V)

People who have been regional party leaders continue to make up the largest sub-group, in terms of job experience, among the group as a whole. Their number has increased to more than 90 percent of the total—thanks to a rise in the number of Central Committee officials who have been republic party secretaries, or first secretaries of kray or oblast party organizations during their careers. More than one fourth of the people holding the top Central Committee posts in December 1975 probably have had such experience. Meanwhile, the percentage of the entire group with experience as a Central Committee official appears to have dropped a bit—due to the reduced number of such people among the RSFSR leaders. One-time officials of the central party bureaucracy still make up more than 25 percent of the group as a whole, however. They still include more than 15 percent and perhaps as much as 20 percent of the RSFSR leaders, and more than 10 and perhaps as much as 15 percent of the minority republic leaders.

The percentage of the entire group with any experience as an official of the national government also has dropped a bit—due to the reduced number among the Central Committee officials and the union-republic leaders. This sub-group has become an even smaller minority than it was in 1964, although it still stands at more than 10 percent among the Central Committee officials. The percentage of the party officials with experience as government officials at the republic, kray, or oblast levels probably has increased a

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bit, however. It certainly has gone up among the Central Committee officials, and a number of such people must be hidden among the RSFSR and union-republic leaders about whom little is known. If so, one-time republic government officials may make up almost 20 percent of the group as a whole, and people who have headed a kray or oblast government may represent nearly 30 percent of that sample.

#### Special Experiences: Wartime Record and Ties with Interest Groups

The percentage of the party officials who served at the front during the war probably has increased to approximately 40 percent. It certainly has gone up among the Central Committee officials, and a number of such people certainly are hidden among the regional leaders about whom little is known. The percentage of the party officials who fought with the partisan units appears to have dropped, however. The figures for those who served with the regular armed forces as political officers or as unit commanders also seem to have dropped a bit. In any event, none of these sub-groups is more than a very small minority among the full sample, although one-time political officers still hold at least 10 percent of the top Central Committee posts.

The number of the party officials who have served with the KGB, the MVD, or other such organizations has increased a bit, but still represents less than 5 percent of the group as a whole. The number has increased among the minority republic leaders, but still represents less than 5 percent of that segment. It has dropped among the Central Committee officials and probably no longer represents 10 percent of that segment. Meanwhile, there has been no change in the number of party officials who have held a diplomatic assignment abroad, or have otherwise been directly involved in the conduct of the USSR's foreign relations. As in the past, both sub-groups constitute very small minorities among the full sample, although those who have held diplomatic assignments still hold more than 10 percent of the top Central Committee posts.

The number of party officials with experience in the education field has risen sharply—especially among the Central Committee officials. They may make up as much as 20 percent of the group as a whole, and they certainly outnumber the one-time agitprop officials among that sample—as well as among the RSFSR leaders. They probably make up at least 30 percent of those holding the top Central Committee posts, and they may have drawn even with the one-time agitprop workers, who make up one third of that sample. On the other hand, they probably remain outnumbered by one-time agitprop workers among the union-republic leaders—the only area where their number has dropped off, and the only area where the number of one-time agitprop workers has increased.

The number of former Komsomol officials also has gone up sharply among the group as a whole—perhaps, to as much as 25 percent of that sample. This is due to the increase among the RSFSR leaders—to somewhere between 20 and 25 percent—and the even larger increase among the union-republic leaders—possibly to more than one third of that segment of the bureaucracy. Meanwhile, the number of such people among the top Central Committee officials probably has remained stable—at 10 percent of that sample. On the other hand, the percentage of people with experience as trade union officials has dropped among the Central Committee officials—as well as among the group as a whole, and among the union-republic leaders. It has increased a bit among the RSFSR leaders only because the former head of the national trade union organization, Politburo member V. V. Grishin, moved to the top post in the Moscow city party organization in July 1967; Grishin is the only RSFSR party leader with any previous affiliation with the trade union apparatus.

The post-Khrushchev period also has brought a small increase in the number of regional party leaders who have been involved in some form of scientific research. Most of this increase has occurred among the minority republic leaders; people with such experience are not to be found among the top Central Committee posts. Meanwhile, Politburo candidate member Rashidov, the Uzbek Republic first secretary, remains the only top party official with any direct affiliation with the creative intelligentsia—as a former head of the republic's branch of the Union of Soviet Writers. While many party officials who have worked in the education or agitprop fields have had to deal with artists, writers, etc., from time to time, Rashidov is the only one who has been a member of that segment of Soviet society.

#### Agricultural and Industrial Experience

The number of people who have at some time been directly involved in farm production has increased among the group as a whole, and now probably stands at a little more than 35 percent of that sample. The number of people with such experience has risen among the Central Committee officials—to 20 percent—and among the minority republic leaders—perhaps to just under 40 percent—and it probably has increased a bit among the RSFSR leaders—perhaps to a little over 40 percent. This is the only area of economic activity where the percentage probably has increased among all three segments of the party bureaucracy, as well as among the group as a whole.

The picture is far more complicated with respect to industry, construction, and related areas of economic activity. The number of party officials who have at some time been involved in industrial production—other than that in the consumer goods field—construction, transportation and communications, the development of fuel supplies or power sources, etc., has



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risen among the group as a whole—perhaps to as much as 40 percent of the full sample. This is due to the sharp increase among the RSFSR leaders, and the somewhat smaller increase among the union-republic leaders, and despite the sharp drop in the number of Central Committee officials with experience in this area.

The increase in the number of party officials who have been directly involved in the production of consumer goods, or in the development of trade facilities or other services, is due to the increase in their number among the Central Committee officials and the RSFSR leaders, and despite a drop in the number of such people among the union-republic leaders. The same also can be said of the small increase that has probably occurred in the number of party officials with any experience in economic planning or work related to that field. Both sub-groups may include ten percent of the Central Committee officials among their number, but both continue to be very small minorities among the group as a whole.

#### **An Older Party Bureaucracy**

The post-Khrushchev years also have produced a group of top party officials who are older—averaging 54.9 years of age in December 1975—than the people holding office in October 1964 were at that time—51.0 years of age. The aging process has been particularly striking among the Central Committee officials, where the average age has jumped from 53.5 to 61.0. The regional party leaders also are more advanced in years, however. The average age of RSFSR leaders has increased from 53.0 to 55.5; that for the minority republic leaders has risen a bit more, from 49.1 to 52.7, but they remain the “youngest” segment of the party bureaucracy. (Table VI)

To be more specific, the number of those who are over 60 has risen sharply; such people now may make up as much as 20 percent of the entire group, rather than less than five percent—as in October 1964. They hold over half of the Central Committee posts and nearly one fourth of the RSFSR jobs, and they probably occupy at least ten percent of the top positions in the union republics. Meanwhile, the number who are 50 or younger seems to have dropped sharply—from 45 percent to less than 35 percent of the group as a whole. These “young” people probably hold less than ten percent of the Central Committee posts; they hold less than one third of the RSFSR posts, but may occupy a little over 40 percent of the top positions in the minority republics.

People who are 41-50 no longer make up the largest sub-group, in terms of age, among the top party officials; this honor has passed to those who are 51-60. The same can be said with respect to the RSFSR leaders, and it probably also is true of the union-republic leaders. Meanwhile, the honor of

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being the largest sub-group among the Central Committee officials may have passed to those who are 61-65 years of age. By the same token, people who are 40 or younger probably have replaced those over 65 as the smallest sub-group among the full sample, as well as among the RSFSR leaders and the Central Committee officials, but probably still outnumber such "gray-beards" among the union-republic leaders.

#### **With More Years of Party Membership**

Not surprisingly, the passage of time has reduced the number of people whose membership in the party dates back to the earlier periods in its history. The number who joined before the Great Purge during the 1930s has dropped from nearly one fourth of those holding office in October 1964, to only a little over five percent of the entire group for December 1975. The number who joined before the mass enrollments during World War II has dropped to an even greater extent—from over 60 percent of those holding office in late 1964, to only a little more than one fourth of the top officials in December 1975. The number who joined before Stalin's death in March 1953 also has gone down sharply—from approximately 95 percent, to about 75 percent among the full sample.

No less unexpected is the fact that the percentage of people whose party membership dates back to the earlier periods is highest among the Central Committee officials, and lowest among the union-republic leaders. More noteworthy, perhaps, is the fact that the reduction in the percentage of people with such ties to the past is, in each case, lowest among the Central Committee officials. The reduction in the percentage of those whose membership in the party pre-dates the Great Purge is highest among RSFSR leaders. The reduction in the percentage of those who joined before the World War II recruitment drives is more or less the same among the RSFSR leaders and the union-republic leaders. The reduction in the percentage of those whose membership dates back to the Stalin period, however, is highest among the minority republic leaders.

On the other hand, the post-Khrushchev years have produced a group of top officials who have more years of party membership than the people holding office in October 1964 had at that time. The percentage of the entire group with more than 40, 45, and 50 years in the party has increased a bit, and the percentage of those with over 35 years of membership probably also has gone up a bit. The number with over 30 years in the party probably has doubled, and it may make up as much as 50 percent of the full sample for December 1975. Such people probably hold three fourths of the top Central Committee posts, approximately 55 percent of the RSFSR jobs, and about 40 percent of the top positions in the union-republics.

The number of those with over 25 years in the party also has risen sharply, and now may stand at only a little less than 70 percent of the full sample. On the other hand, the number of those with over 20 years in the party probably has remained at the 1964 level. Although the number of such people has risen among the Central Committee officials—perhaps to 100 percent—and among the RSFSR leaders—perhaps to 90 percent—it has dropped among the union-republic leaders—possibly to less than 80 percent. There has been little, if any, change in the percentage of the entire group with more than ten years in the party, and the corresponding figures for the individual segments of the bureaucracy also are more or less the same as in October 1964. The same also can be said of the figures for those with more than five years of party membership.

#### And Longer Tenure in the Ruling Elite

The post-Khrushchev years also have brought a reduction in the number of top party officials whose membership in the ruling elite extends back to the earlier periods. The percentage with membership dating back to the years under Stalin has dropped from 16.1 to 4.6, and the figure for those with membership going back to the 20th Congress in February 1956—the start of de-Stalinization—has dropped from 24.2 to 6.3 percent. The figure for those with membership dating back to the 22nd Congress in October 1961 has dropped from 71.4 to 24.8 percent, and only 35.6 percent of the full sample for December 1975 have membership extending back to the Khrushchev years; 32.4 percent have moved up since the 24th Congress ended in April 1971, and 18.8 percent have done so since July 1973.

The percentage of those with membership in the ruling elite extending back to the earlier periods is highest among the Central Committee officials. It is lowest in most cases among the union-republic leaders; the exceptions are for those who moved up during the period between the 19th Congress in October 1952 and the 21st Congress in January-February 1959. Here, again, the reduction in the percentage of people with membership in the ruling elite dating back to a particular period has been lowest among the Central Committee officials, except in cases where the number among the RSFSR and union-republic leaders makes a meaningful comparison impossible. The reduction in the percentage of those with membership dating back to the Stalin years is highest among the union-republic leaders—as are the reductions in the figures for those with membership dating back to the 20th Congress, or to the Khrushchev years. The reduction in the percentage of those with membership dating back to the 22nd or 21st congresses, however, is highest among the RSFSR leaders.

Meanwhile, there has been little change in the number of party officials who have been members of the ruling elite for more than 20 years. The

percentage with more than 40, or over 45 years of tenure has dropped a bit; the figure for those with more than 30, or over 35 years has remained stable; and that for the people with more than 20, or over 25 years of tenure has increased but little. The percentage with more than 15 years of tenure has risen sharply, however—to 15.1 percent. The percentage with more than ten years of tenure has more than doubled—to 36.1 percent; and the percentage for those with more than five years of membership in the ruling elite has risen from 37.7 to 60.9 percent.

Here, too, the highest percentages are found among the Central Committee officials, and the lowest are found among the union-republic leaders. Ten percent of the Central Committee officials have been members of the ruling elite for more than 20 years; only 5 percent of the RSFSR leaders and less than 3 percent of the union-republic leaders have such tenure. One third of the Central Committee officials have been members for over 15 years; the corresponding figures for the RSFSR and union-republic leaders are 12.8 and 12.2 percent respectively. Half of the Central Committee officials have over ten years of tenure; the corresponding figures are 39.8 percent among the RSFSR leaders, and 30.6 percent among the union-republic leaders; 83.3 percent of the Central Committee officials have more than five years of tenure—as do 65.5 percent of the RSFSR leaders, and 52.7 percent of the union-republic leaders.

It is also noteworthy that the increase in the percentage of people with more than 5, 10, or 15 years in the ruling elite has been higher among the top Central Committee officials than it has been among either the RSFSR leaders or the union-republic leaders. The increase in the percentage of those with more than 10, or over 15 years in the ruling elite also has been higher among the RSFSR leaders than it has been among the union-republic leaders. The increase in those with more than five years of tenure, however, has been higher among the union-republic leaders than it has been among the RSFSR leaders. This is due to the fact that most of the housecleanings in the minority republics during the post-Khrushchev period have been carried out either shortly after Khrushchev's removal from office, or since the 24th Congress, and have not been spaced out as evenly as the RSFSR changes.

#### **Ethnic Minority Representation**

The post-Khrushchev period has brought few significant changes in the ethnic composition of the party hierarchy. The high number of "unknowns" among the people holding the top Central Committee posts in October 1964, and the even higher number among those holding the positions in December 1975 prevents any firm conclusions about a de-Russification of that segment of the bureaucracy. The percentage of Belorussians has risen, however, and

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the percentage of Latvians has done likewise. Whether this has been accompanied by a shift in the balance between Russians and Ukrainians is another matter. (Table VII)

On the other hand, it is clear that there has been no change in the lack of representation among this segment of the bureaucracy for the other minorities. There are no Lithuanians, Estonians, or Moldavians holding any of the top Central Committee posts. The peoples of the Transcaucasus—the Armenians, Azerbaydzhanis, and Georgians—also are excluded from this circle. The Kazakhs also remain without representation, as do the peoples of Central Asia—the Uzbeks, Kirgizi, Tadzhiks, and Turkmens. As in the past, the top Central Committee posts are held by Slavs—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians—for the most part. The one Latvian who is the exception to this rule also is a European, rather than a representative of any of the hundred or more non-European nationalities in the USSR.

Meanwhile, there has been a drop in the percentage of the top RSFSR posts that are held by Russians. The percentage of Ukrainians in such jobs has gone up a bit, and the percentage of “others”—Kalmyks, Buryat-Mongols, etc.—also has risen. On the other hand, there appears to have been an increase in the number of the top posts in the union republics that are held by Russians—in the Ukraine, as well as in Armenia, Belorussia, Estonia, Tadzhikistan, and Turkmenistan. The number of top posts held by Russians may have dropped in Kazakhstan, however, and it certainly has done so in Latvia—as has the number of posts held by Ukrainians in Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan. As a result, there appears to have been little, if any, change in the percentage of “outsiders” among those holding the top posts in the minority republics.

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FOOTNOTES

1. *XXIV Syezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovet kogo Soyuz: Stenograficheskii Otchet*; Moscow, 1971; Vol. I, p. 123.
2. I. V. Kapitonov, *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 4, February 1975, p. 14.
3. K. U. Chernenko (Chief of the CPSU Central Committee's General Department), *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 9, September 1971, pp. 3-18.

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Table I

Local Party Committees Entitled to Full-Time Professional Staffs: 1952-1965

	Oct. 1952	Jan. 1956	Oct. 1961	Jan. 1963	Jan. 1965
Union-Republic Central Committees.....	15	15	14	14	14
Kray Party Committees.....	8	8	7	14	7
Oblast Party Committees.....	167	146	136	218	133
Okrug Party Committees.....	36	10	10	10	10
City Party Committees.....	544	554	602	1,057	738
Urban Rayon Party Committees.....	4,886	485	343		396
Rural Rayon Party Committees.....		4,248	3,202		2,434
Collective Farm-State Farm Production Administration Party Committees....	...	...	...	1,634	...
Industrial Zone Party Committees.....	...	...	...	348	...

The figures for 1952 are from "Report of the Credentials Commission of the 19th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)—Report of Comrade N. M. Pegov" in *Pravda*; October 9, 1952; p. 6. The figures for 1956 and 1961 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 1, January 1962, p. 52. The figures for 1963 are from *Yezhegodnik, Bolshoi Sovetskoi Entsiklopedii*, 1964, p. 14. The figures for 1965 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 10, May 1965, p. 17. The figures for 1963 reflect the situation immediately after the re-organization in late 1962; those for 1965 reflect the situation after the undoing of that re-organization, a step taken only a month after Khrushchev left office in October 1964.

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Table II

The Elective "Aktiv" and the Network of Party Organs: 1952-1965

	Oct. 1952	Jan. 1956	Oct. 1961	Jan. 1965
Members and Candidate Members of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission.....	273	318	395	439**
Members and Candidate Members of Union-Republic Communist Party Central Committees and of Kray, Oblast, Okrug, City, and Rayon Party Committees, and of the auditing commissions of those party organizations.....	...	...	306,000	328,000
Members of Party Committees and Bureaus of Primary Party Organizations and Shop Party Organizations, Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of those party organizations, and Party Group Organizers.....	...	...	1,800,000	2,600,000
Union-Republic Party Organizations.....	15	15	14	14
Kray Party Organizations.....	8	8	7	7
Oblast Party Organizations.....	167	146	136	133
Okrug Party Organizations.....	36	10	10	10
City Party Organizations.....	544	554	602	738
Urban Rayon Party Organizations.....	LESSO	485	343	396
Rural Rayon Party Organizations.....			1,218	2,434
Collective Farm-State Farm Production Administration Party Organizations.....	...	...	...	...
Industrial Zone Party Organizations.....	...	...	...	...
Primary Party Organizations.....	350,305	351,249	296,444	311,907
Shop Party Organizations.....	52,054*	76,058	187,000	267,481
Party Groups.....	112,150*	122,243	174,000	329,613

\*The figures on shop party organizations and party groups in 1952 are for January of that year, not October, but there probably was relatively little change in the number of such party organizations during that ten month interval.

\*\*The figure for the CPSU Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission membership in January 1965 actually is the number of people elected to those bodies at the 23rd Congress in March-April 1966. It would appear to be a fairly accurate reflection of the number of people operating at that level of the hierarchy in early 1965, however, far more so than the figure for October 1961.

The figure for the elective "aktiv" in 1952 is from *Pravda*, October 15, 1952, pp. 1-2; the figure for 1956 is from *Pravda*, February 26, 1956, p. 1; the figures for 1961 are from *Pravda*, November 1, 1961, p. 2, and *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 1, January 1962, pp. 53-54; the figures for 1965 are from *Pravda*, April 9, 1966, p. 2, and *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 10, May 1965, p. 17. The figures for the network of party organs in January 1952 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, p. 23; those for October 1952 are in "Report of the Credentials Commission of the 19th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks): Report of Comrade N. M. Pegov," in *Pravda*, October 9, 1952, p. 6. The figures for 1956 are in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 1, January 1962, p. 52, and *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, pp. 22-23. Those for 1961 are in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 1, January 1962, pp. 52-54. Those for 1965 are in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 10, May 1965, pp. 15-17.



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**Table III**  
**Education Levels of Party Officials: 1952-1966**  
**(on January 1 of the corresponding year)**

Date	Higher Education	Incomplete Higher Education	Secondary Education	Incomplete Secondary Education	Elementary Education
A: Secretaries of Union-Republic Central Committees, Kray Party Committees, and Oblast Party Committees					
1952.....	67.7%	10.1%	17.8%	3.7%	0.7%
1956.....	86.0	6.6	6.3	1.1	...
1961.....	92.0	4.0	3.9	0.1	...
1966.....	97.0	1.9	1.1	...	...
B: Secretaries of City and Rayon Party Committees					
1952.....	18.4%	43.9%	25.5%	9.2%	3.0%
1956.....	25.7	52.9	17.3	3.7	0.4
1961.....	67.8	24.2	7.7	0.3	...
1966.....	89.4	7.4	3.2	...	...
C: Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations					
1952.....	9.3%	4.7%	27.3%	29.3%	29.4%
1956.....	11.4	7.9	29.5	30.6	20.6
1961.....	19.7	7.3	37.9	24.8	10.3
1966.....	28.3	5.9	43.3	18.1	4.4

*Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, pp. 25-26.

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**THE CENTRAL PARTY MACHINE**  
**13 OCTOBER 1964**  
**(EVE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S OUSTER)**

**SECRETARIAT**

FIRST SECRETARY  
 N. S. Khrushchev

SECRETARIES  
 L. I. Brezhnev

F. R. Kozlov

N. V. Podgorny

M. A. Suslov

Yu. V. Andropov

P. N. Demichev

L. F. Il'ichev

V. I. Polyakov

B. N. Ponomarev

A. P. Rudakov

A. N. Shelepin

V. N. Titov

**ADMINISTRATION OF AFFAIRS**

K. P. Chernyayev

**COMMISSIONS AND BUREAUS**

COMMISSION FOR  
 ORGANIZATIONAL-  
 PARTY QUESTIONS  
 CHAIRMAN  
 V. N. Titov

IDEOLOGICAL  
 COMMISSION  
 CHAIRMAN  
 L. F. Il'ichev

BUREAU FOR  
 CHEMICAL AND  
 LIGHT INDUSTRIES  
 CHAIRMAN  
 P. N. Demichev

BUREAU FOR  
 INDUSTRY AND  
 CONSTRUCTION  
 CHAIRMAN  
 A. P. Rudakov

BUREAU FOR  
 AGRICULTURE  
 CHAIRMAN  
 V. I. Polyakov

**DEPARTMENTS OF COMMISSIONS AND BUREAUS**

PARTY ORGANS  
 V. N. Titov?

IDEOLOGICAL  
 L. F. Il'ichev?  
 PRAVDA  
 P. A. Satyukov  
 KOMMUNIST  
 V. P. Stepanov

CHEMICAL INDUSTRY  
 ?  
 LIGHT AND FOOD  
 INDUSTRY AND TRADE  
 P. I. Maksimov

DEFENSE  
 INDUSTRY  
 I. D. Serbin  
 HEAVY INDUSTRY  
 ?  
 MACHINE BUILDING  
 V. S. Frolov  
 CONSTRUCTION  
 A. Ye. Biryukov  
 TRANSPORTATION AND  
 COMMUNICATIONS  
 K. S. Simonov

AGRICULTURE  
 V. I. Polyakov?  
 AGRICULTURAL  
 RAW MATERIALS  
 PROCESSING  
 INDUSTRY  
 M. G. Lushin

**OTHER DEPARTMENTS**

GENERAL  
 V. N. Malin  
 CADRES ABROAD  
 A. S. Panyushkin?

ADMINISTRATIVE  
 ORGANS  
 N. R. Mironov  
 FINANCE AND  
 PLANNING ORGANS?  
 ?

MAIN POLITICAL  
 DIRECTORATE,  
 SOVIET ARMY  
 AND NAVY  
 A. A. Yepishev

ECONOMIC  
 COLLABORATION  
 WITH SOCIALIST  
 COUNTRIES  
 B. P. Miroshnichenko

LIAISON WITH  
 COMMUNIST AND  
 WORKERS PARTIES  
 OF SOCIALIST  
 COUNTRIES  
 Yu. V. Andropov?

INTERNATIONAL  
 P. N. Ponomarev?

**SCHOOLS AND INSTITUTES**

INSTITUTE OF MARXISM-LENINISM  
 P. N. Pospelov

HIGHER PARTY SCHOOL  
 N. R. Mironov

ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
 G. P. Frantsev

**BUREAU FOR THE RSFSR**

CHAIRMAN  
 N. S. Khrushchev  
 FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN  
 A. P. Kirilenko  
 MEMBERS  
 G. G. Abramov  
 V. S. Tolstikov

CHAIRMAN  
 N. S. Khrushchev  
 FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN  
 L. N. Yefremov  
 MEMBERS  
 G. I. Voronov  
 N. G. Ignatov  
 N. G. Yegorychev

CHAIRMAN  
 N. S. Khrushchev  
 FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN  
 L. N. Yefremov  
 MEMBERS  
 M. A. Yasnov  
 G. V. Yenyutin

**BUREAUS OF THE BUREAU FOR THE RSFSR AND THEIR DEPARTMENTS****BUREAU FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION RSFSR**

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 A. P. Kirilenko?  
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 M. I. Khaldeyev  
 PARTY ORGANS  
 N. A. Voronovsky  
 HEAVY INDUSTRY,  
 TRANSPORT AND  
 COMMUNICATIONS  
 S. A. Baskakov  
 MACHINE BUILDING  
 ?  
 CHEMICAL INDUSTRY  
 V. D. Belyayev  
 CONSTRUCTION  
 A. V. Gladyshevsky  
 LIGHT AND FOOD  
 INDUSTRY AND TRADE  
 P. K. Sizov

**BUREAU FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF AGRICULTURE RSFSR**

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 AGRICULTURE  
 I. S. Pankin  
 AGRICULTURAL RAW  
 MATERIALS PROCESSING  
 INDUSTRY AND TRADE  
 A. I. Tyasto

**OTHER DEPARTMENTS FOR THE RSFSR**

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS  
 V. I. Loputin

FINANCE AND PLANNING ORGANS?  
 ?

SOVetskaya Rossiya  
 K. I. Zarodov

**REGIONAL BUREAUS**

CENTRAL ASIAN BUREAU  
 CHAIRMAN  
 V. G. Lomonosov

CHAIRMAN  
 G. N. Bochkarev

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Chart A  
Chapter II

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# THE CENTRAL PARTY MACHINE

## 15 FEBRUARY 1966

### SECRETARIAT

#### FIRST SECRETARY

L. I. Brezhnev

#### SECRETARIES

P. N. Demichev

N. V. Podgorny

A. N. Shelepin

M. A. Suslov

D. F. Ustinov

Yu. V. Andropov

I. V. Kapitanov

F. D. Kulakov

B. N. Ponomarev

A. P. Rudokov

### ADMINISTRATION OF AFFAIRS

G. S. Pavlov

### DEPARTMENTS

ORGANIZATIONAL-  
PARTY WORK  
I. V. Kapitonov?

GENERAL  
?

PROPAGANDA  
AND AGITATION  
V. I. Stepokov

PRAVDA  
M. V. Zimyonin

KOMMUNIST  
A. G. Yegorov

CULTURE  
V. F. Shauro?

SCIENCE AND  
EDUCATIONAL  
INSTITUTIONS  
S. P. Trapeznikov

ADMINISTRATIVE  
ORGANS  
?

MAIN POLITICAL  
DIRECTORATE,  
SOVIET ARMY  
AND NAVY  
A. A. Yepshev

ECONOMIC  
COLLABORATION  
WITH SOCIALIST  
COUNTRIES  
?

LIAISON WITH  
COMMUNIST AND  
WORKERS PARTIES  
OF SOCIALIST  
COUNTRIES  
Yu. V. Andropov?

INTERNATIONAL  
D. P. Shevlyagin?

CADRES ABROAD  
A. S. Ponyushkin?

DEFENSE INDUSTRY  
I. D. Serbin

HEAVY INDUSTRY  
A. P. Rudakov?

MACHINE BUILDING  
V. S. Frolov

CHEMICAL  
INDUSTRY  
V. M. Bushuyev

CONSTRUCTION  
A. Ye. Biryukiv

TRANSPORT AND  
COMMUNICATIONS  
K. S. Simonov

FINANCE AND  
PLANNING  
ORGANS?  
?

LIGHT AND FOOD  
INDUSTRY  
P. K. Sizov

TRADE AND  
EVERDAY SERVICES  
Yo. I. Kabkov

AGRICULTURE  
F. D. Kulokov?

### SCHOOLS AND INSTITUTES

INSTITUTE OF MARXISM-LENINISM  
P. N. Pospelov

HIGHER PARTY SCHOOL  
N. R. Mitronov

ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
V. N. Malin

### BUREAU FOR THE RSFSR

FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN  
A. P. Kirilenko

CHAIRMAN  
L. I. Brezhnev

FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN  
L. N. Yefremov?

#### MEMBERS

G. G. Abromov?  
G. I. Voronov

N. G. Ignotov  
M. A. Yosnov

V. A. Karlov  
N. G. Yegorychev

V. S. Tolstikov  
G. V. Yenyutin?

### DEPARTMENTS FOR THE RSFSR

ORGANIZATIONAL-  
PARTY WORK  
?

PROPAGANDA  
AND AGITATION  
M. I. Kholdeyev

CULTURE  
?

SCIENCE AND  
EDUCATIONAL  
INSTITUTIONS  
?

ADMINISTRATIVE  
ORGANS  
V. I. Loputin

SOVETSKAYA  
ROSSIYA  
V. P. Moskovsky

HEAVY INDUSTRY,  
TRANSPORT AND  
COMMUNICATIONS  
S. A. Boskokov

MACHINE BUILDING  
I. I. Kozlov

CHEMICAL  
INDUSTRY?  
V. D. Belyayev?

CONSTRUCTION  
A. V. Gladyshevsky

FINANCE AND  
PLANNING  
ORGANS?  
?

LIGHT AND FOOD  
INDUSTRY AND  
TRADE?  
?

AGRICULTURE  
V. A. Korlov

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Table I

## The Network of Party Organs: 1956-1975

Party Unit	Jan. 1956	Oct. 1961	Jan. 1965	Jan. 1966	Jan. 1971	Jan. 1975
Union-Republic.....	15	14	14	1	14	11
Kray and Oblast.....	154	143	140	139	148	154
Okrug.....	10	10	10	9	10	10
City.....	554	602	738	739	760	...
Urban district.....	485	513	396	439	448	...
Rural raion.....	4,218	3,202	2,434	2,519	2,810	2,853
Primary Organizations.....	351,249	296,444	311,907	326,886	369,695	386,000
Shop Organizations.....	76,058	187,600	267,481	287,236	352,871	391,000 +
Party Groups.....	122,243	174,000	329,613	351,463	443,233	515,000
Primary and Shop Party Committees.....	...	12,000	20,128	21,711	31,000	35,000

The figures for 1956 are in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 1, January 1962, p. 52, and *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, pp. 22-23. Those for 1961 are in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 1, January 1962, pp. 52-54. Those for 1965 are in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 10, May 1965, pp. 15-17. Those for 1966 are in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, pp. 21-23. Those for 1971 are from the reports by I. I. Brezhnev and by I. V. Kapitonov at the 24th Congress (XIV S'ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: *Stenograficheskiy Otchet*; Moscow, 1971; Vol I, pp. 117-126 and 330-336) and from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, pp. 21-23. The figures for 1975 are from I. V. Kapitonov, *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 4, February 1975, pp. 10-19; and N. A. Petrovichev, in No. 11, June 1975, pp. 15-24.

Table II

## A: Size of Primary Party Organizations

Number of Members	Jan. 1956	Jan. 1961	Jan. 1965	Jan. 1966	Jan. 1971	Jan. 1973	Jan. 1975
14.....	62.2%	43.7%	39.9%	40.0%	40.2%	40.5%	40.6%
15-49.....	35.9*	43.8	43.5	43.3	42.2	41.8	41.3
50-100.....		8.1	10.5	10.7	11.3	11.5	11.8
101.....	1.9	4.4	6.1	6.0	6.2	6.2	6.3

## B: Average Membership of Primary Organizations

Industrial							
Enterprises.....	38	57	78	N/A	87	89	91
Construction							
Sites.....	26	35	42	N/A	39	39	40
State Farms.....	25	68	78	N/A	72	69	57**
Collective Farms..	13	33	40	N/A	48	49	
Scientific							
Institutions.....	45	70†	86	N/A	N/A	N/A	93

\*21.4 percent had 15-25 members; 14.5 percent had 26-100 members.

\*\*This figure is the average for state and collective farms combined; the 1975 figures did not provide a separate figure for each.

†This figure is an approximation, based on the figures for July 1961 and January 1962.

The figures for 1956 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 1, January 1962. Those for 1961, 1966, and 1973 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973. Those for 1965 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 10, May 1965. Those for 1971 are from *Partinaya Stroitel'stvo: Uchebnoye Posobie* (N. Petrovichev, chief editor) Moscow, 1971; p. 188. Those for 1975 are from N. Petrovichev's article in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 11, June 1975.

Table III

Party Personnel Changes: April 1966–December 1975

Party Unit	Apr. 1966– Mar. 1971	Apr. 1971– Jul. 1973	Aug. 1973– Dec. 1975	Apr. 1971– Dec. 1975
CPSU Central Committee.....	8/30	1/30	4/30	5/30
Russian Republic (RSFSR).....	35/78	13/78	11/78	22/78*
Union-Republics Total.....	72/153	33/157	45/161	71/161*
Armenia.....	0/6	3/6	4/6	6/6*
Azerbaijan.....	6/7	0/7	1/7	1/7
Belorussia.....	6/12	4/12	3/12	6/12*
Estonia.....	3/6	0/6	0/6	0/6
Georgia.....	3/8	6/8	5/8	8/8*
Kazakhstan.....	9/21**	5/25**	6/25	11/25**
Kirgizia.....	4/7	2/9**	3/9	5/9**
Latvia.....	4/6	1/6	4/6	4/6*
Lithuania.....	3/6	0/6	2/6	2/6
Moldavia.....	4/6	0/6	1/6	1/6
Tadzhikistan.....	3/8**	1/8	3/9**	4/9**
Turkmenistan.....	4/9**	0/9	3/11**	3/11**
Ukraine.....	16/32	8/32	6/32	14/32
Uzbekistan.....	7/17**	3/17	4/18**	6/18* **

\*Instances where the figures in the April 1971–July 1973 and August 1973–December 1975 columns do not add up to the figures in the April 1971–December 1975 column are due to a position's having changed hands more than once during the post-congress period.

\*\*The number of positions in the column represents the total at the end of the period in question. The number of changes, however, does not include the election of new first secretaries in newly-created oblasts. There were three in Kazakhstan and in Turkmenistan, and one in both Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan during the April 1966–March 1971 period. There were two both in Kazakhstan and in Kirgizia during the April 1971–July 1973 period; and two in Turkmenistan, and one in both Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan during the August 1973–December 1975 period.

The number of positions in the CPSU Central Committee apparatus includes all department chiefs and their equivalents, or the first deputy chief in instances where a department is headed by a CPSU Secretary or has been allowed to operate for a considerable length of time without any chief. The RSFSR posts include the first and second secretaries of the Moscow and Leningrad Oblast and City Party Committees, and the first secretaries of the other kray, oblast, and autonomous republics within the RSFSR. The union-republic posts include the first, second, and other secretaries of the republic party central committees, the first secretaries of any oblast or autonomous republic party organizations within the republics, and the first secretaries of the city party organization in the republic capitals.

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Table I

The Elective "Aktiv": 1961-1973

	Oct. 1961	Apr. 1966	Apr. 1971	Jan. 1973
Members and Candidate Members of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission.....	395	439	477	495†
Members and Candidate Members of Union-Republic Communist Party Central Committees and of Kray and Oblast Party Committees, and of Auditing Commissions of those party organizations.....	306,000*	25,200	...	28,400
Members and Candidate Members of Okrug, City, and Rayon Party Committees, and of Auditing Commissions of those party organizations.....		325,000	...	363,200
Members of Party Committees and Party Bureaus, Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations...			...	1,797,000
Members of Party Committees and Party Bureaus, Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of Shop Party Organizations, and Party Group Organizers.....	1,800,000*	2,650,000**	...	1,801,000

\*The figures for 1961 lump the "aktiv" at the union-republic, kray, and oblast levels together with the "aktiv" at the okrug, city, and rayon levels. They also give a combined figure for the "aktiv" at the primary and shop party organizations and at party groups.

\*\*The figures for 1966 lump the "aktiv" at the primary organization level together with the "aktiv" at shop organizations and party groups.

†This figure represents an educated guess, based on the increase in such people during the intervals between previous congresses.

The figures for 1961 are from *Pravda*, November 1, 1961, and from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 1, January 1962. Those for 1966 are from *Kommunist* No. 15, October 1967, and from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973. Those for 1971 and 1973 also are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973.

Table II

Members and Candidate Members of Union-Republic Central Committees, and of Kray, Oblast, Okrug, City, and Rayon Party Committees

	Elected in late 1965-early 1966	Elected in late 1970-early 1971
Workers and Peasants.....	33.6%	38.2%
Heads of Enterprises in Industry, Transport, Communications, Construction and Sovkhozes.....	12.8	12.2
Engineering-Technical Workers and Farming Specialists.....	8.4	6.3
Party Officials.....	6.8	16.2
Local Soviets' Officials.....	10.7	10.4
Science, Education, Culture, and Public Health Officials and Specialists.....	8.6	7.2
Others (those serving in armed forces, pensioners, housewives, students, etc.).....	4.1	9.5
Women.....	1.3	23.2

*Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, p. 24

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**Table III**  
**Education Levels of Party Officials: 1956-1973**

Date	Higher Education	Incomplete Higher Education	Secondary Education	Incomplete Secondary Education	Elementary Education
<b>A: Secretaries of Union-Republic Central Committees, Kray Party Committees, and Oblast Party Committees</b>					
Jan. 1956.....	86.0%	6.6%	6.3%	1.1%	...
Jan. 1961.....	92.0	4.0	3.9	0.1	...
Jan. 1966.....	97.0	1.9	1.1	...	...
Jan. 1971.....	98.9	0.3	0.8	...	...
Jan. 1973.....	99.2	0.1	0.7	...	...
<b>B: Secretaries of City and Rayon Party Committees</b>					
Jan. 1956.....	25.7%	52.9%	17.3%	3.7%	0.4%
Jan. 1961.....	67.8	24.2	7.7	0.3	...
Jan. 1966.....	89.4	7.4	3.2	...	...
Jan. 1971.....	96.4	2.9	0.7	...	...
Jan. 1973.....	97.7	1.9	0.4	...	...
<b>C: Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations</b>					
Jan. 1956.....	11.4%	7.9%	29.5%	30.6%	20.6%
Jan. 1961.....	19.7	7.3	37.9	24.8	10.3
Jan. 1966.....	28.3	5.9	43.3	18.1	4.4
Jan. 1971.....	38.5	5.4	44.8	10.3	1.0
Jan. 1973.....	42.1	4.7	44.4	8.2	0.6

The figures are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, pp. 25-26.

Table IV  
Education of Top Party Officials

Type of Higher Education Institution Attended	CPSU Central Committee*		Russian Republic (RSFSR) **		Union-Republics †		Total CPSU Officials	
	Oct. 1961	Dec. 1975	Oct. 1964	Dec. 1975	Oct. 1964	Dec. 1975	Oct. 1964	Dec. 1975
Agricultural Inst.	4 = 13.3%	3 = 10.0%	26 = 33.3%	23 = 29.5%	28 = 22.8%	33 = 25.2%	58 = 25.2%	59 = 24.8%
Engineering School (Polytechnical Inst.) or Industrial Academy (Inst.)	8 = 26.7	8 = 26.7	25 = 32.1	26 = 33.3	29 = 23.6	32 = 24.4	62 = 26.9	66 = 27.1
University	5 = 16.7	3 = 10.0	6 = 7.7	6 = 7.7	13 = 10.6	14 = 8.1	21 = 10.1	20 = 8.1
Teachers College, Pedagogical Inst., etc.	2 = 6.7	9 = 30.0	3 = 3.9	5 = 6.4	18 = 14.7	16 = 12.2	23 = 10.0	30 = 12.6
Military Academy	2 = 6.7	1 = 3.3	1 = 1.3	1 = 1.3	1 = 0.8	0 = 0.0	1 = 1.7	2 = 0.8
Higher Party School	5 = 16.7	2 = 6.7	17 = 21.8	12 = 15.4	13 = 10.4	33 = 25.2	65 = 28.2	47 = 19.7
of which, attended only a party school	5 = 16.7	1 = 3.3	14 = 18.0	9 = 11.6	27 = 17.1	18 = 13.7	46 = 20.0	28 = 11.8
Incomplete Higher Educ.	1 = 3.3	1 = 3.3	5 = 6.4	1 = 1.3	2 = 1.6	1 = 0.8	8 = 3.5	3 = 1.3
Education Unknown	1 = 3.3	4 = 13.3	0 = 0.0	2 = 2.6	7 = 5.7	25 = 19.1	8 = 3.5	31 = 13.0

\*The CPSU Central Committee posts include the heads of the individual departments and their equivalents (for example, the director of the CPSU Central Committee Higher Party School, the chief editor of *Pravda*, etc.) or the first deputy editor in chief of the main department in which the official held the position. Secretary of the department has had no chief for a considerable length of time.

\*\*The RSFSR posts are the first and second secretary slots in the Moscow and Leningrad city and oblast party organizations, and the first secretary slots in the other krais, oblasts, and autonomous republics within the RSFSR. The 1964 group excludes the oblast units abolished in December 1961.

†The Union-Republic posts include the first and second secretaries of the 14 union-republic party organizations, the first secretaries of the party organizations in each capital city, and the first secretaries of any oblast or autonomous republic party organizations within the union-republics. They also include the party secretaries for ideology, agriculture, and industry and any other republic central committee secretaries in Belorussia, Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.



Table V

## Career Backgrounds of Top Party Officials

	CPSU Central Committee		Russian Republic (RSFSR)		Union-Republics		Total CPSU Officials	
	Oct. 1964	Dec. 1975	Oct. 1964	Dec. 1975	Oct. 1964	Dec. 1976	Oct. 1964	Dec. 1975
A: Type of Career								
Professional Politician.....	22 = 73.3%	16 = 53.3%	60 = 77.0%	60 = 77.0%	86 = 70.0%	86 = 65.7%	168 = 72.8%	162 = 68.0%
Technocrat.....	8 = 26.7	11 = 36.7	18 = 23.0	11 = 14.1	30 = 24.4	21 = 16.1	56 = 24.2	43 = 18.0
Specialist.....	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0
Unknown.....	0 = 0.0	3 = 10.0	0 = 0.0	7 = 9.0	7 = 5.7	24 = 18.3	7 = 3.0	34 = 14.2
B: Specific Jobs or Areas of Employment								
CPSU Central Committee.....	30 = 100.0%	30 = 100.0%	19 = 24.4%	14 = 18.0%	15 = 12.2%	17 = 13.0%	64 = 27.8%	61 = 25.6%
Regional Party Leader.....	5 = 16.7	7 = 23.3	78 = 100.0	78 = 100.0	123 = 100.0	131 = 100.0	206 = 89.3	216 = 90.8
USSR Council of Ministers.....	6 = 20.0	4 = 13.3	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	3 = 2.4	1 = 0.8	9 = 3.9	5 = 2.1
USSR Supreme Soviet Official.....	1 = 3.3	1 = 3.3	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	1 = 0.4	1 = 0.4
Republic Government Official.....	2 = 6.7	3 = 10.0	1 = 1.3	0 = 0.0	35 = 28.5	33 = 25.2	38 = 16.5	36 = 15.1
Chairman, Regional Government.....	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	34 = 50.0	27 = 34.7	30 = 24.4	23 = 17.6	64 = 27.8	50 = 21.0
Remained at home during war.....	18 = 60.0	15 = 50.0	49 = 63.0	52 = 66.7	73 = 59.3	54 = 41.3	140 = 60.8	121 = 50.8
Served at front during war.....	9 = 30.0	11 = 36.7	29 = 37.3	26 = 33.3	49 = 39.9	45 = 34.3	87 = 37.8	82 = 34.4
Fought with partisans in war.....	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	4 = 5.1	2 = 2.6	10 = 8.2	5 = 3.8	14 = 6.1	7 = 2.9
Political officer during war.....	4 = 13.3	3 = 10.0	3 = 3.9	0 = 0.0	9 = 7.3	2 = 1.5	16 = 6.9	5 = 2.1
Professional soldier.....	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	1 = 1.3	1 = 1.3	1 = 0.8	0 = 0.0	2 = 0.9	1 = 0.4
Service with KGB, MVD, etc.....	4 = 13.3	2 = 6.7	2 = 2.6	2 = 2.6	1 = 0.8	6 = 4.6	7 = 3.0	10 = 4.2
Service with Ministry of Foreign Affairs (outside East Europe or Socialist Bloc).....	2 = 6.7	2 = 6.7	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	1 = 0.8	1 = 0.8	3 = 1.3	3 = 1.3
Service with Ministry of Foreign Affairs in East Europe or Socialist Bloc.....	4 = 13.3	4 = 13.3	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	4 = 1.7	4 = 1.7
Work in Education Field.....	1 = 3.3	7 = 23.3	10 = 12.8	11 = 14.1	25 = 20.4	20 = 15.3	26 = 11.3	38 = 15.9
Work in Agitprop Field.....	10 = 33.3	10 = 33.3	4 = 5.1	4 = 5.1	17 = 14.8	21 = 16.0	31 = 13.5	35 = 14.7
Komsomol Official.....	3 = 10.0	1 = 3.3	7 = 9.0	12 = 15.4	24 = 19.5	39 = 29.8	34 = 14.8	52 = 21.8
Trade Unions Official.....	2 = 6.7	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	1 = 1.3	7 = 5.7	4 = 3.1	9 = 3.9	5 = 2.1
Involved in Scientific Research.....	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	2 = 2.6	3 = 3.9	2 = 1.6	8 = 6.1	4 = 1.7	11 = 4.6
Involvement in Arts & Letters.....	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	1 = 0.8	1 = 0.8	1 = 0.4	1 = 0.4
Farm Production.....	4 = 13.3	6 = 20.0	30 = 38.6	30 = 38.6	39 = 31.8	44 = 33.6	73 = 31.7	80 = 33.5
Industry (no specific area).....	2 = 6.7	0 = 0.0	12 = 13.3	14 = 18.0	30 = 24.4	23 = 17.6	44 = 19.1	37 = 15.5
Industry, heavy.....	7 = 23.3	5 = 16.7	11 = 14.1	10 = 12.8	7 = 5.7	12 = 9.2	25 = 10.9	27 = 11.3
Industry, consumer goods.....	2 = 6.7	3 = 10.0	0 = 0.0	2 = 2.6	5 = 4.1	4 = 3.1	7 = 3.0	9 = 3.8
Transportation & Communications.....	2 = 6.7	1 = 3.3	2 = 2.6	7 = 9.0	8 = 6.5	7 = 5.3	12 = 5.2	15 = 6.3
Economic Planning.....	1 = 3.3	2 = 6.7	0 = 0.0	1 = 1.3	4 = 3.3	2 = 1.5	5 = 2.2	5 = 2.1
Little Information Available.....	5 = 16.7	4 = 13.3	2 = 2.6	7 = 9.0	2 = 1.6	16 = 12.2	9 = 3.9	27 = 11.3

Table VI

## Age, Length of Party Membership, and Tenure in Ruling Elite

	CPSU Central Committee*		Russian Republic (RSFSR)**		Union-Republics†		Total CPSU Officials	
	Oct. 1964	Dec. 1975	Oct. 1964	Dec. 1975	Oct. 1964	Dec. 1975	Oct. 1964	Dec. 1975
<b>A: Age of Party Leaders</b>								
Average age.....	53.5	61.0	53.0	55.5	49.10	52.67	51.0	54.9
40.....	2 = 6.7%	0 = 0.0%	1 = 1.3%	0 = 0.0%	15 = 12.2%	2 = 1.5%	18 = 7.8%	2 = 0.8%
41-50.....	8 = 26.7	2 = 6.7	38 = 48.8	25 = 32.1	58 = 47.2	43 = 32.9	104 = 45.1	70 = 29.3
51-60.....	16 = 53.5	9 = 30.0	37 = 47.5	29 = 37.3	40 = 32.5	50 = 38.2	93 = 40.3	88 = 36.9
61-65.....	2 = 6.7	10 = 33.3	2 = 2.6	14 = 18.0	4 = 3.3	9 = 6.9	8 = 3.5	33 = 13.8
66-.....	2 = 6.7	6 = 20.0	0 = 0.0	4 = 5.1	0 = 0.0	2 = 1.5	2 = 0.9	12 = 5.0
Unknown.....	0 = 0.0	3 = 10.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	6 = 4.9	25 = 19.1	6 = 2.6	28 = 11.7
<b>B: Length of Party Membership</b>								
Joined party before 1917.....	2 = 6.7%	1 = 3.3%	0 = 0.0%	0 = 0.0%	2 = 1.6%	0 = 0.0%	4 = 1.7	1 = 0.4%
1924.....	2 = 6.7	1 = 3.3	1 = 1.3	0 = 0.0	2 = 1.6	0 = 0.0	5 = 2.2	1 = 0.4
1931.....	9 = 30.0	6 = 20.0	12 = 15.4	2 = 2.6	11 = 8.9	0 = 0.0	32 = 13.9	8 = 3.4
1937.....	13 = 43.2	9 = 30.0	21 = 27.0	4 = 5.1	19 = 15.5	1 = 0.8	53 = 23.0	14 = 5.9
1942.....	22 = 73.3	17 = 56.7	55 = 70.7	25 = 32.1	65 = 52.9	18 = 13.8	142 = 61.5	60 = 25.2
1946.....	26 = 86.7	23 = 76.7	74 = 95.0	46 = 59.0	99 = 80.6	55 = 42.0	199 = 81.2	124 = 52.0
1953.....	28 = 93.3	26 = 86.7	77 = 98.8	61 = 78.3	112 = 91.0	85 = 65.1	217 = 94.0	172 = 71.0
1956.....	29 = 96.7	27 = 90.0	78 = 100.0	68 = 87.0	116 = 94.2	99 = 96.8	223 = 75.8	194 = 81.3
1959.....	29 = 96.7	27 = 90.0	78 = 100.0	71 = 91.0	117 = 95.1	105 = 97.2	224 = 80.3	203 = 85.1
1962.....	29 = 96.7	27 = 90.0	78 = 100.0	72 = 93.3	117 = 95.1	110 = 84.0	224 = 97.2	209 = 87.5
Oct. 1964.....	29 = 96.7	27 = 90.0	78 = 100.0	72 = 92.3	117 = 95.1	110 = 84.0	224 = 97.2	209 = 87.5
Unknown.....	1 = 3.3	3 = 10.0	0 = 0.0	6 = 7.7	6 = 4.9	21 = 16.0	7 = 3.0	30 = 12.6
Party member for over 50 years.....	1 = 3.3%	1 = 3.3%	0 = 0.0%	0 = 0.0%	0 = 0.0%	0 = 0.0%	1 = 0.4%	1 = 0.4%
for over 45 years.....	2 = 6.7	4 = 13.3	0 = 0.0	2 = 2.6	2 = 1.6	1 = 0.8	4 = 1.7	7 = 2.9
for over 40 years.....	2 = 6.7	9 = 30.0	1 = 1.3	4 = 5.1	7 = 5.7	1 = 0.8	10 = 4.3	14 = 5.9
for over 35 years.....	6 = 20.0	14 = 46.7	8 = 10.3	13 = 16.7	20 = 16.3	8 = 6.1	34 = 14.7	35 = 14.7
for over 30 years.....	11 = 36.7	21 = 70.0	21 = 27.0	41 = 52.7	23 = 18.6	46 = 35.2	55 = 23.8	108 = 45.4
for over 25 years.....	12 = 40.0	24 = 80.0	24 = 30.8	53 = 68.0	91 = 74.0	74 = 56.7	127 = 55.0	151 = 63.3
for over 20 years.....	24 = 80.0	27 = 90.0	66 = 84.7	67 = 86.0	108 = 87.9	95 = 72.7	198 = 85.9	189 = 79.4
for over 15 years.....	26 = 86.7	27 = 90.0	76 = 97.5	72 = 92.3	115 = 93.5	106 = 81.1	217 = 93.9	205 = 86.2
for over 10 years.....	27 = 90.0	27 = 90.0	78 = 100.0	72 = 92.3	117 = 95.1	110 = 84.0	222 = 96.2	209 = 87.7
for over 5 years.....	28 = 93.3	27 = 90.0	78 = 100.0	72 = 92.3	117 = 95.1	110 = 84.0	223 = 96.6	209 = 87.7
Unknown.....	2 = 6.7	3 = 10.0	6 = 0.0	0 = 7.7	6 = 4.9	21 = 16.0	8 = 3.5	30 = 12.6
<b>C: Tenure in Ruling Elite</b>								
Joined Elite before 1924.....	1 = 3.3%	0 = 0.0%	0 = 0.0%	0 = 0.0%	0 = 0.0%	0 = 0.0%	1 = 0.4%	0 = 0.0%
1935.....	1 = 3.3	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	1 = 0.4	0 = 0.0
1942.....	4 = 13.3	2 = 6.7	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	3 = 2.4	0 = 0.0	7 = 3.0	2 = 0.8
1946.....	4 = 13.3	2 = 6.7	1 = 1.3	0 = 0.0	4 = 3.3	0 = 0.0	9 = 3.9	2 = 0.8
1953.....	7 = 23.3	4 = 13.3	11 = 14.1	4 = 5.1	19 = 15.5	3 = 2.3	37 = 16.1	11 = 4.6
1956.....	8 = 26.7	4 = 13.3	18 = 23.1	4 = 5.1	30 = 24.4	7 = 5.3	56 = 24.2	15 = 6.3
1959.....	13 = 43.3	8 = 26.7	51 = 65.5	7 = 9.0	45 = 36.6	20 = 15.3	109 = 47.2	35 = 14.7
1962.....	23 = 76.7	11 = 36.7	64 = 82.0	25 = 32.1	78 = 63.3	23 = 17.6	165 = 71.4	59 = 24.8
Oct. 1964.....	30 = 100.0	15 = 50.0	78 = 100.0	30 = 38.6	123 = 100.0	40 = 30.6	231 = 100.0	85 = 35.6
Apr. 1966.....		19 = 63.3		37 = 47.5		47 = 35.8		103 = 43.2
Jan. 1969.....		22 = 73.3		44 = 51.5		57 = 43.5		123 = 51.6
Apr. 1971.....		25 = 83.3		57 = 73.1		79 = 60.3		161 = 67.6
Aug. 1973.....		27 = 90.0		69 = 88.5		98 = 74.9		194 = 81.2
Jan. 1976.....		30 = 100.0		78 = 100.0		131 = 100.0		239 = 100.0
Elite member for over 50 years.....	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0
for over 45 years.....	1 = 3.3	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	1 = 0.4	0 = 0.0
for over 40 years.....	1 = 3.3	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	1 = 0.4	0 = 0.0
for over 35 years.....	1 = 3.3	1 = 3.3	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	1 = 0.4	1 = 0.4
for over 30 years.....	1 = 3.3	2 = 6.7	1 = 1.3	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	2 = 0.9	2 = 0.8
for over 25 years.....	1 = 3.3	3 = 10.0	1 = 1.3	1 = 1.3	1 = 0.8	1 = 0.8	3 = 1.3	5 = 2.1
for over 20 years.....	4 = 13.3	3 = 10.0	1 = 1.3	4 = 5.1	3 = 2.4	3 = 2.3	8 = 3.5	10 = 4.2
for over 15 years.....	5 = 16.7	10 = 33.3	2 = 2.6	10 = 12.8	6 = 4.9	16 = 12.2	13 = 5.6	36 = 15.1
for over 10 years.....	6 = 20.0	15 = 50.0	12 = 15.4	31 = 39.8	20 = 16.3	40 = 30.6	38 = 16.5	86 = 36.1
for over 5 years.....	12 = 40.0	25 = 83.3	34 = 50.0	51 = 65.5	41 = 33.3	69 = 52.7	87 = 37.7	145 = 60.9

\*The CPSU Central Committee posts are held by the heads of the individual departments, or the first deputy chief in the event that the department is headed by a CPSU Secretary, or has had no chief for a considerable length of time.

\*\*The RSFSR posts are the first and second secretary slots in the Moscow and Leningrad Oblast and City party organizations, and the first secretary slots in the other krais and oblasts or autonomous republics within the RSFSR.

†The Union-Republic posts include the first and second secretaries of the 14 union-republic party organizations, the first secretary of the party organization in each republic capital city, and the first secretaries of any oblast or autonomous republic party organization within those republics. They also include the party secretaries for ideology, agriculture, and industry (and any other republic central committee secretaries) in the four largest union-republics—Belorussia, Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

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	CPSU Central Committee		Russian Republic (RSFSR)		Union-Republics			
	Oct. 1964	Dec. 1975	Oct. 1964	Dec. 1975	Oct. 1964	Dec. 1975		
<b>A: Nationality Representation</b>								
Russians.....	19 = 63.3%	13 = 43.3%	59 = 75.9%	49 = 62.9%	19 = 15.5%	26 = 19.9%		
Ukrainians.....	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	8 = 10.3	10 = 12.8	38 = 30.9	29 = 22.1		
Belorussians.....	0 = 0.0	2 = 6.7	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	12 = 9.8	6 = 4.6		
Kazakhs.....	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	8 = 6.5	13 = 10.0		
Uzbeks.....	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	12 = 9.8	10 = 7.7		
Armenians.....	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	4 = 3.3	2 = 1.5		
Azerbaijdzhani.....	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	3 = 2.4	3 = 2.3		
Estonians.....	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	3 = 2.4	2 = 1.5		
Georgians.....	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	3 = 2.4	2 = 1.5		
Kirgizi.....	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	2 = 1.6	4 = 3.1		
Latvians.....	0 = 0.0	1 = 3.3	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	1 = 0.8	2 = 1.5		
Lithuanians.....	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	2 = 1.6	2 = 1.5		
Moldavians.....	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	1 = 0.8	2 = 1.5		
Tadzhiks.....	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	3 = 2.4	3 = 2.3		
Turkmens.....	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	1 = 0.8	4 = 3.1		
Others.....	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	11 = 14.1	12 = 15.4	4 = 3.3	2 = 1.5		
Unknown.....	11 = 36.7	14 = 46.7	0 = 0.0	7 = 9.0	8 = 6.5	19 = 14.5		
	Oct. 1964		Dec. 1975					
	Major Nationality	Other Natives	Outside Nationality	Unknown	Major Nationality	Other Natives	Outside Nationality	Unknown
<b>B: Republic Leadership</b>								
Russian Republic (RSFSR).....	59 = 75.9%	11 = 14.1%	8 = 10.3%	0 = 0.0%	49 = 62.9%	12 = 15.4%	10 = 12.8%	7 = 9.0%
Armenia.....	3 = 100.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	2 = 66.7	0 = 0.0	1 = 33.3	0 = 0.0
Azerbaijdzhani.....	3 = 75.0	0 = 0.0	1 = 25.0	0 = 0.0	3 = 75.0	0 = 0.0	1 = 25.0	0 = 0.0
Belorussia.....	12 = 92.3	0 = 0.0	1 = 7.7	0 = 0.0	6 = 50.0	0 = 0.0	3 = 25.0	3 = 25.0
Estonia.....	3 = 100.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	0 = 0.0	2 = 66.7	0 = 0.0	1 = 33.3	0 = 0.0
Georgia.....	3 = 60.0	1 = 20.0	1 = 20.0	0 = 0.0	2 = 40.0	0 = 0.0	1 = 20.0	2 = 40.0
Kazakhstan.....	7 = 28.0	1 = 4.0	13 = 52.0	4 = 16.0	13 = 52.0	0 = 0.0	9 = 36.0	3 = 12.0
Kirgizia.....	2 = 50.0	0 = 0.0	2 = 50.0	0 = 0.0	4 = 66.7	0 = 0.0	1 = 16.7	1 = 16.7
Latvia.....	1 = 33.3	0 = 0.0	2 = 66.7	0 = 0.0	2 = 66.7	0 = 0.0	1 = 33.3	0 = 0.0
Lithuania.....	2 = 66.7	0 = 0.0	1 = 33.3	0 = 0.0	2 = 66.7	0 = 0.0	1 = 33.3	0 = 0.0
Moldavia.....	1 = 33.3	0 = 0.0	1 = 33.3	1 = 33.3	2 = 66.7	0 = 0.0	1 = 33.3	0 = 0.0
Tadzhikistan.....	3 = 75.0	0 = 0.0	1 = 25.0	0 = 0.0	3 = 50.0	0 = 0.0	2 = 33.3	1 = 16.7
Turkmenistan.....	1 = 33.3	0 = 0.0	1 = 33.3	1 = 33.3	4 = 50.0	0 = 0.0	2 = 25.0	2 = 25.0
Ukraine.....	30 = 91.0	0 = 0.0	2 = 6.1	1 = 3.0	27 = 84.8	0 = 0.0	3 = 9.4	2 = 6.3
Uzbekistan.....	12 = 70.6	0 = 0.0	2 = 11.8	1 = 5.9	9 = 50.0	2 = 11.1	2 = 11.1	5 = 27.8
Total.....	142 = 71.3	13 = 6.5	36 = 18.1	8 = 4.0	132 = 63.1	14 = 6.7	39 = 18.7	26 = 12.4

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